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GREECE’S NOT-SO-WARM WELCOME 
TO UNACCOMPANIED MINORS: 
REFORMING EU LAW TO PREVENT 
THE ILLEGAL TREATMENT OF 
MIGRANT CHILDREN IN GREECE 
I have been here 26 days, after I came from Turkey. For three 
days in the beginning I was sleeping on the floor. Now I’m 
sharing a bed with another five people: a Somali, a Bangla-
deshi, an Afghani, an Egyptian, and one other Eritrean. We 
use the bed in shifts, which means that some use the bed dur-
ing the day and others during the night. In general, we are 83 
people in a room with 30 beds.1 
- Fourteen-year-old Eritrean unaccompanied 
minor detained at the Fylakio detention center in 
Greece   
We don’t have any clothes. The toilet is broken. The sewage 
comes out. There’s a very bad smell. If a person comes here, 
100 percent he will get sick . . . The youngest boy is 12 years 
old . . . we’re children but we’re treated badly.2 
-  Fourteen-year-old Afghan unaccompanied mi-
nor detained at the Fylakio detention center in Greece 
INTRODUCTION 
necdotes such as the ones above are not uncommon    
among minors currently detained in Greece.3 Compelled 
by poverty, armed conflict, and persecution, thousands of mi-
nors from the Middle East, Africa, and Asia migrate to the Eu-
ropean Union each year in search of a better life.4 Largely due 
                                                                                                             
 1. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, THE EU’S DIRTY HANDS 30 (2011) [hereinafter 
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, THE EU’S DIRTY HANDS]. 
 2. Human Rights Watch’s Updated Submission to the Committee on the 
Rights of the Child on Greece (Apr. 25, 2012), 
http://www.hrw.org/news/2012/04/25/human-rights-watchs-updated-
submission-committee-rights-child-greece. 
 3. See generally HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, THE EU’S DIRTY HANDS, supra 
note 1. 
 4. Jacqueline Bhabha, Minors or Aliens? Inconsistent State Intervention 
and Separated Child Asylum-Seekers, 3 EUR. J. MIGRATION & L. 283, 288 
(2001); Iro Nikolakopoulou-Stephanou, Greek and European Policy Priorities 
for Controlling Illegal Immigration, 59 R.D.H.I. 641, 641, 653 (2006). 
A
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to its location at the EU’s external borders,5 Greece has become 
a primary channel through which a majority of these migrants 
from the East enter the EU, oftentimes with the hope of con-
tinuing on to other European nations to settle.6 As a result, 
Greece has become overburdened by the number of migrants 
entering the state seeking either improved opportunities, or in 
some more dire cases, asylum.7 As a whole, migrants constitute 
approximately 10% of Greece’s entire population.8 
                                                                                                             
 5. Sharita Gruberg, De Facto Statelessness among Undocumented Mi-
grants in Greece, 18 GEO. J. POVERTY L. & POL’Y 533, 539 (2011). 
 6. Mark Lowen, Journey across Crisis-Hit Greece, BBC NEWS (Jun. 9, 
2012, 1:54 AM), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-18371800 (“Over 
80% of those entering the European Union now pass through Greece.”); Hele-
na Smith, Greek Crackdown on Illegal Immigrants Leads to Mass Arrests, 
GUARDIAN (Aug. 7, 2012), 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/aug/07/greece-crackdown-illegal-
immigrants-arrest; Matina Stevis, Illegal Immigration Emerges as New Cri-
sis for Greece—And EU, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 15, 2012), 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10000872396390444506004577617383132000
476.html [hereinafter Stevis, New Crisis for Greece] (quoting Greece’s minis-
ter of public order, Nikos Dendias, as calling Greece the “buffer zone of Eu-
rope” in that it carries “a disproportionate burden” of the migration move-
ment). 
 7. In one news article, it was reported that 
Greece launched an aggressive campaign [in August 2012] to try to 
seal its 130-mile northeastern border, as it faces a debilitating finan-
cial crisis that has caused a swell in joblessness and a surge in racist 
attacks against immigrants with dark skin. The police operation . . . 
brought nearly 2,000 additional border guards to the Turkish fron-
tier previously manned by about 500 officers. . . . In the first week of 
the crackdown in early August, police said they apprehended nearly 
7,000 people for identification checks; nearly 1,700 were slated for 
deportation. . . . Greece is a member of Europe’s passport-free 
Schengen agreement but shares no borders with any of the other 25 
member states. That has meant hundreds of thousands of irregular 
immigrants have been unable to cross the border into other Europe-
an countries, trapping them in limbo in Athens and other Greek cit-
ies, typically in slum conditions. 
Greece Cracks Down on Illegal Immigration amid Financial Crisis, FOX NEWS 
(Aug. 22, 2012), http://www.foxnews.com/world/2012/08/22/greece-cracks-
down-on-illegal-immigration-amid-financial-crisis/; see also Gruberg, supra 
note 5, at 539 (describing the burden placed on Greece due to the entrance of 
de facto stateless migrants, exacerbated by the EU’s Dublin II regulation); 
Nicholas Paphitis, 6,000 Suspected Illegal Immigrants Detained in Greece, 
USA TODAY (Aug. 6, 2012), 
http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/world/story/2012-08-06/greece-illegal-
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This heavy migration creates a strain on Greece, which is ex-
acerbated by several factors. First, the EU’s Dublin II regula-
tion (“Dublin II”) governing which member state is responsible 
for the asylum applications of irregular migrants, non-EU na-
tionals who enter the EU “clandestinely” by land or sea or with 
falsified documents, 9  places burdensome obligations on EU 
border states.10 Dublin II typically requires the nation in which 
the migrant initially arrived to examine that individual’s appli-
cation.11 Thus, until European courts limited or placed tempo-
rary bans on returns to Greece,12 those migrants that had con-
                                                                                                             
immigrants/56819230/1 (“Some 100,000 illegal immigrants are estimated to 
slip into Greece every year, mostly from neighboring Turkey, and up to a mil-
lion are believed to live in Greece, which has an official population of about 
10 million.”). 
 8. Nick Malkoutzis, Why Immigration Is Troubling Greece More Than the 
Economy, SOC. EUR. J. (Mar. 4, 2012), http://www.social-
europe.eu/2012/04/why-immigration-is-troubling-greece-more-than-the-
economy/. 
 9. Irregular Immigration, EUR. COMM’N, http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-
affairs/what-we-do/policies/immigration/irregular-immigration/index_en.htm 
(last updated Apr. 26, 2013) (defining “irregular migrants” as non-EU na-
tionals “entering the EU clandestinely via land and sea routes, or those who 
have acquired false travel documents”). 
 10. Council Regulation 343/2003, of 18 February 2003 Establishing the 
Criteria and Mechanisms for Determining the Member State Responsible for 
Examining an Asylum Application Lodged in One of the Member States by a 
Third-Country National, 2003 O.J. (L 50) 1 [hereinafter Dublin II Regula-
tion]; see also Steve Coll, The Other Greek Crisis, NEW YORKER DAILY 
COMMENT (Sept. 20, 2012), 
http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/comment/2012/09/afghan-asylum-
seekers-in-greece.html (describing Greece as the “migrant bottleneck” of the 
EU and attributing this to the “flawed” Dublin II regulation); LAURA KOK, 
THE DUBLIN II REGULATION. A UNHCR DISCUSSION PAPER 12 (2006), available 
at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/pdfid/4445fe344.pdf. Since the Regulation’s 
initial drafting stages, the Office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees 
has “expressed concern that the criterion of illegal border crossing could re-
sult in serious imbalances in the distribution of asylum applicants among 
Member States. Such imbalances would not only pose problems to States sit-
uated at the external borders of the European Union,” but could also result in 
a lack of protection for these “asylum-seekers and refugees.” Id. 
 11. Dublin II Regulation, supra note 10, art. 10(1), at 5. 
 12. See, e.g., M.S.S. v. Belgium & Greece, App. No. 30696/09, ¶¶ 149, 391 
(Eur. Ct. H.R. Jan. 21, 2011), available at 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-103050; EU Court 
Warns UK and Irish over Asylum Transfers, BBC NEWS (Dec. 21, 2011, 8:00 
AM), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-16285573; J. Michael Kenne-
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tinued on to other member states and attempted to lodge asy-
lum applications in those nations were removed to the nation of 
their original entry (commonly Greece).13 Once removed, the 
migrants were required to remain in their nation of entry until 
asylum was either granted or refused. 14  Second, other EU 
member states are reluctant to share in Greece’s burden due to 
general hostilities toward migrants.15 Many states are apathet-
ic toward Greece’s crisis and do not wish to contribute to border 
control efforts, thereby leaving it to fend for itself with regard 
to the migrant influx. 16  Finally, Greece’s already distressed 
                                                                                                             
dy, For Illegal Immigrants, Greek Border Offers a Back Door to Europe, N.Y. 
TIMES (July 14, 2012), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/15/world/europe/illegal-immigrants-slip-
into-europe-by-way-of-greek-border.html (noting a January 2011 European 
Court of Human Rights case where the court “ruled that sending asylum 
seekers back to Greece could infringe on their fundamental rights” because of 
the poor conditions resulting from the Greek system); Stevis, New Crisis for 
Greece, supra note 6. 
 13. Dublin II Regulation, supra note 10, art. 16(1)(a), at 6; Nicholas De 
Blouw, Drowning Policies: A Proposal to Modify the Dublin Agreement and 
Reduce Human Rights Abuses in the Mediterranean, 40 CAL. W. INT’L L.J. 
335, 364 (2010); KOK, supra note 10, at 12 (noting the possibility of “serious 
imbalances in the distribution of asylum applicants” in those EU member 
states along its external borders and noting the concern expressed by the 
UNHCR that these imbalances would be compounded by “the criterion of ille-
gal border crossing”). 
 14. Dublin II Regulation, supra note 10, art. 16(1)(a), at 6; De Blouw, su-
pra note 13, at 364. 
 15. See Christopher Caldwell, Europe’s Arizona Problem, N.Y. TIMES (June 
11, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/12/opinion/12Caldwell.html (opin-
ing that “most . . . of Europe . . . does not like mass migration”); Kennedy, 
supra note 12 (stating that the “flow [of migration] has raised tensions 
throughout Europe, to the point where the top French official responsible for 
immigration seriously suggested that a wall be built along the entire bor-
der”); Malkoutzis, supra note 8 (describing an attitude of indifference toward 
Greece’s migration crisis and a view that the migrant influx problem is 
Greece’s alone); Valentina Pop, Europeans Say They Are Tolerant but Oppose 
Immigration, EUOBSERVER (Mar. 14, 2011, 9:23 AM), 
http://euobserver.com/social/31980 (citing to polls that record high levels of 
opposition among EU citizens to migration from outside the EU); Rosie 
Scammell, EU Commissioner Advances Idea of Common Migration Policy, 
EUR. UNIV. INST. (June 25, 2012), http://www.eui.eu/News/2012/25-06-
Malmstrom-MPC.aspx (noting a general unwillingness to welcome migrants 
due to high levels of youth unemployment throughout the EU). 
 16. Malkoutzis, supra note 8 (noting that although the EU’s border moni-
toring agency, Frontex, had committed to helping patrol the Greek-Turkish 
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economy cannot handle the added burden of the migrant popu-
lation.17 As a result, the migrant population, which includes 
unaccompanied minors,18 has become a scapegoat for the eco-
nomic crisis Greece is facing.19 
For these reasons, Greece has cracked down on illegal immi-
gration, arresting and detaining many unaccompanied minors 
as they would adults.20 While Dublin II typically requires ex-
                                                                                                             
border, there has been a demonstrated “lack of interest from EU states in 
committing more resources” to these types of efforts). 
 17. Chloe Hadjimatheou, Greeks Confront Crime Wave amid Austerity, 
BBC NEWS (Aug. 16, 2012, 4:42 AM), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-radio-
and-tv-19269891; Stevis, New Crisis for Greece, supra note 6 (noting “domes-
tic unrest over the influx of foreign arrivals”); The Unstoppable Flow, 
ECONOMIST, Feb. 17, 2011, available at 
http://www.economist.com/node/18178167. 
 18. See generally Annual Report 2013: Greece, AMNESTY INT’L, 
http://www.amnesty.org/en/region/greece/report-2013 (last visited Sept. 24, 
2013); HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, LEFT TO SURVIVE: SYSTEMATIC FAILURE TO 
PROTECT UNACCOMPANIED MIGRANT CHILDREN IN GREECE (2008) [hereinafter 
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, LEFT TO SURVIVE]. 
 19. Hadjimatheou, supra note 17; see also Stevis, New Crisis for Greece, 
supra note 6 (quoting EU Commissioner for Home Affairs Cecilia Malmstrom 
as saying “the current crisis is being exploited by populist parties who are 
trying to shift the blame from poorly managed national economies to immi-
grant populations”). In a news analysis, Panos Damelos, a Greek anti-racism 
campaigner, stated that migrants have made “easy targets” throughout 
Greece’s “economic crisis.” Hadjimatheou, supra. The article states that alt-
hough most crimes are in fact attributable to Greeks, the government has 
targeted immigrants as it is quite easy “to channel the public’s anger towards 
the weakest in society.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Furthermore, 
Damelos “believes that the bad press is responsible for [the] massive increase 
in attacks on migrants.” Id. As a result, police have been patrolling the 
streets in an effort to crack down jointly on crime and on illegal immigration. 
Id. In August 2012, a “controversial crackdown” resulted in the detention of 
approximately 6000 migrants in Athens alone. Id. 
 20. In a news article regarding Greek crackdowns on illegal migrants, 
Greece is described as follows: 
Europe’s main entry point for illegal immigrants from Asia and Afri-
ca seeking a better life in the West. But Greece’s severe economic 
problems and high unemployment are making the problem worse 
than ever. Police said [on August 6, 2012] that 6,000 people were de-
tained over [the preceding] weekend in Athens in a massive opera-
tion. . . . Officers across the city were seen stopping mostly African 
and Asian people in the street for identification checks. Most were 
only briefly detained, but about 1,600 were arrested for illegally en-
tering Greece and sent to holding centers pending deportation. 
750 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 39:2 
ceptional circumstances to justify detention, authorities have 
detained many of these suspected irregular migrants for rea-
sons beyond those deemed “exceptional.”21 As a result of grow-
ing hostility toward the migrant masses, the arrests and sub-
sequent detentions by Greek police are often based merely on 
antipathy toward non-EU foreigners.22 Until recently, substan-
tial numbers of migrants arrived each day in Greece through 
the Greece-Turkey border.23 However, with the construction of 
a fence built to deter such migration, more and more undocu-
mented migrants are regularly traveling by sea.24 The country’s 
                                                                                                             
Paphitis, supra note 7; see also Greece Cracks Down on Illegal Immigration 
amid Financial Crisis, supra note 7 (describing how police crackdowns on 
illegal immigrants have encountered “strong criticism from human rights 
groups, local officials, and even police officers’ associations—with criticism 
focusing on alleged racial profiling and police brutality. Allegations include 
arbitrary detention, beatings and degrading police treatment”); Smith, supra 
note 6 (“An estimated million immigrants are believed to live in Greece where 
the population is barely 11 million. . . . But the country’s economic crisis and 
growing political radicalisation has given rise to a xenophobic backlash, the 
uncontrolled influx blamed for a sharp spike in violent crime.”). 
 21. See Greece: Halt Mass Migrant Round-Ups, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH 
(Aug. 8, 2012), http://www.hrw.org/news/2012/08/08/greece-halt-mass-
migrant-round-ups [hereinafter Greece: Halt Mass Migrant Round-Ups]; see 
also De Blouw, supra note 14, at 340–41; Greece Cracks Down on Illegal Im-
migration amid Financial Crisis, supra note 7 (“Amnesty International called 
on Greek authorities to stop the roundups [of immigrants] immediately. . . . 
‘While Greece has the right to control migration, it does not have the right to 
treat people like criminals purely because of the color of their skin.’”). 
 22. See Greece Cracks Down on Illegal Immigration amid Financial Crisis, 
supra note 7; Hadjimatheou, supra note 17; Greece: Halt Mass Migrant 
Round-Ups, supra note 21; Kennedy, supra note 12 (noting that Greek offi-
cials have “vowed” to eradicate and expel all illegal immigration). 
 23. See Amnesty Int’l, Enter at Your Peril: Lives Put at Risk at the Gate of 
Europe 3, AI Index EUR 25/007/2013 (July 9, 2013), available at 
http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/EUR25/007/2013/en/f70e0f38-4084-
48ad-9f7a-606ad053d693/eur250072013en.pdf [hereinafter Amnesty Int’l, 
Enter at Your Peril]. 
 24. Id. at 3; EU: Improve Migrant Rescue, Offer Refuge, HUMAN RIGHTS 
WATCH (Oct. 23, 2013), http://www.hrw.org/news/2013/10/23/eu-improve-
migrant-rescue-offer-refuge [hereinafter Human Rights Watch, EU: Improve 
Migrant Rescue] (“With the Greece-Turkey land border virtually sealed due to 
increased patrols, including by Frontex, and the construction of a . . . fence, 
more and more asylum seekers and migrants of all nationalities are setting 
off from the Turkish coast to reach Greek islands in the Aegean Sea.”); Mat-
ina Stevis, Boat Tragedy Prompts New Look at Migration Policy in Europe, 
WALL ST. J., Oct. 7, 2013, available at 
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immigration and asylum system has been unable to withstand 
the continuous burden of such heavy migration.25 As a result, 
the conditions in detention centers holding irregular migrants, 
whether seeking asylum or not, are consistently worsening.26 
Conditions have been characterized as “unsanitary,” “degrad-
ing,” “overcrowded,” and generally abusive.27 
Notably, these groups of migrants often include large num-
bers of vulnerable, “stateless,” and frequently unaccompanied 
children28 who are detained along with adults and thus also 
exposed to the objectionable conditions of Greek detention cen-
                                                                                                             
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB100014240527023046261045791213728
22047060 (noting Frontex’s report that  “more than half of the illegal mi-
grants arriving in Europe go through Greece’s borders” and the shift to sea 
routes since the sealing off of Greece’s northern border with Turkey). 
 25. Greece Cracks Down on Illegal Immigration amid Financial Crisis, 
supra note 7 (describing the burden of the heavy flow of migration on Greece); 
Thomas Hammarberg, Council of Eur. Comm’r for Human Rights, The ‘Dub-
lin Regulation’ Undermines Refugee Rights, COUNCIL OF EUR. COMM’R’S 
HUMAN RIGHTS COMMENT (Sept. 22, 2010), 
http://commissioner.cws.coe.int/tiki-view_blog_post.php?postId=80 (describ-
ing the asylum procedures in Greece as “gravely dysfunctional”); see also Ire-
ne Chapple, Europe’s Lost Children, CNN (July 18, 2013), 
http://edition.cnn.com/EUROPE/afghan-immigrant-children/ (describing 
Greece’s asylum system as “dysfunctional . . . with limited numbers able to 
apply for protection and low success rates for applicants”). 
 26. Amnesty Int’l, Enter at Your Peril, supra note 23, at 7; Eur. Comm. for 
the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punish-
ment, Public Statement Concerning Greece, CPT/Inf (2011) ¶¶ 3–4, 7 (Mar. 
15, 2011), http://www.cpt.coe.int/documents/grc/2011-10-inf-eng.pdf [herein-
after Public Statement Concerning Greece]. 
 27. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, STUCK IN A REVOLVING DOOR 39, 67–68, 83 
(2008), 
http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/greeceturkey1108web_0.pdf 
[hereinafter HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, STUCK IN A REVOLVING DOOR]. 
 28. According to the Office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, 
[a]n unaccompanied child is a person who is under the age of eight-
een, unless, under the law applicable to the child, majority is at-
tained earlier and who is “separated from both parents and is not be-
ing cared for by an adult who by law or custom has responsibility to 
do so.” 
Office of the U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees [UNHCR], Guidelines on Poli-
cies and Procedures in Dealing with Unaccompanied Children Seeking Asy-
lum ¶ 3.1 (Feb. 1997), available at 
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3ae6b3360.html. 
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ters.29 The United Nations (“U.N.”) General Assembly has rec-
ognized unaccompanied minors as “among the most vulnerable 
refugees.”30 International organizations attribute this vulnera-
bility to a combination of their age, refugee status, and inabil-
ity to adequately protect themselves.31 Nonetheless, due to a 
shortage of “care places”32 available to unaccompanied minors 
upon their arrival in Greece, many are detained for lengthy pe-
riods of time in squalid, overcrowded detention centers and al-
legedly, at times, at the hands of oppressive Greek law en-
forcement.33 Because of these detention conditions, the Europe-
an Court of Human Rights recently ruled that Greece is violat-
                                                                                                             
 29. Leigh Phillips, Greece’s Locked Up Migrant Children Attempt Suicide, 
EUOBSERVER (July 27, 2010, 3:37 PM), http://euobserver.com/justice/30545. 
 30. G.A. Res. 58/150, U.N. Doc. A/RES/58/150 (Dec. 22, 2003), available at 
http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/58/150&Lang=E 
(The U.N. General Assembly noted that unaccompanied minors are “among 
the most vulnerable refugees and the most at risk of neglect, violence, forced 
military recruitment and sexual assault and therefore require special assis-
tance and care.”). 
 31. Id.; see also Z et al. v. U.K., App. No. 29392/95, (1999) 28 EUR. H.R. 
REP. CD 65, ¶ 93 (Eur. Comm’n on H.R.) (Children “by reason of their age 
and vulnerability are not capable of protecting themselves,” and thus need 
special protection, placing a “positive obligation” on authorities.). 
 32. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, LEFT TO SURVIVE, supra note 18, at 53, 65; see 
also Human Rights Watch, Greece: Create Open Centers for Migrant Chil-
dren, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (Aug. 23, 2009), 
http://www.hrw.org/news/2009/08/23/greece-create-open-centers-migrant-
children [hereinafter Human Rights Watch, Greece: Create Open Centers for 
Migrant Children]. So-called “accommodation centers” designed to help care 
for and provide services to unaccompanied migrant children are running “be-
yond their capacit[ies]” and are scarce. Human Rights Watch, Greece: Create 
Open Centers for Migrant Children, supra. Most are unsuitable for long-term 
accommodation. Id. In addition, the foster care system is unavailable to non-
Greek children. Id. 
 33. Updated Human Rights Watch Submission to the U.N. Comm. Against 
Torture, on Greece (Apr. 25, 2012), available at 
http://www.hrw.org/news/2012/04/25/updated-human-rights-watch-
submission-united-nations-committee-against-torture-greec. In many deten-
tion centers throughout Greece, “unaccompanied migrant children [are] 
commingled with unrelated adults in the same overcrowded detention space.” 
Id. Human Rights Watch has “gathered credible testimonies from migrants 
who told [the organization] they had been ill-treated at the hands of Greek 
law enforcement officers.” Id. These reports included testimony regarding the 
ill treatment of unaccompanied minors. Id. 
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ing Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights34 
by subjecting migrants to inhumane and degrading treat-
ment.35 
The U.N. has called the detention of unaccompanied minors 
“illegal.” 36  Greece’s conduct toward unaccompanied migrant 
children violates a number of its international legal obligations, 
in particular, the U.N. Convention on the Rights of the Child 
(“CRC”) and the European Convention on Human Rights 
(“ECHR”).37 Due to the legal requirements imposed on member 
states regarding irregular migration, the EU must step in and 
amend its laws so that Greece meets its international law obli-
gations. 
This Note proposes an amendment to the current law govern-
ing Greece’s treatment and care of unaccompanied migrant 
children. It argues that the EU must share in the responsibility 
for Greece’s noncompliance with its treaty obligations and 
amend its laws in ways that both compel and facilitate Greece’s 
compliance. Part I of this Note provides background on the 
problem of Greece’s detention of unaccompanied minors, ex-
plaining why they arrive unaccompanied and why they flee to 
Greece. Part I also discusses Greece’s international law obliga-
tions under two multilateral treaties to which Greece is a par-
ty—the CRC and the ECHR. Part II explains how Greece is 
currently violating its treaty obligations, highlighting the 2011 
case of M.S.S. v. Belgium & Greece and explaining the role the 
EU’s Dublin II regulation plays in Greek detention conditions. 
Part III proposes a two-part solution to Greece’s violations of 
                                                                                                             
 34. “No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment.” European Convention on Human Rights, art. 3, 
Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222. 
 35. M.S.S. v. Belgium & Greece, App. No. 30696/09, ¶ 234 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 
Jan. 21, 2011), available at 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-103050. 
 36. Emily A. Benfer, In the Best Interests of the Child?, 14 IND. INT’L & 
COMP. L. REV. 729, 734 (2004) (quoting Special Rapporteur of the Comm’n on 
Human Rights, Human Rights of Migrants, Comm’n on Human Rights, U.N. 
Doc. E/CN.4/2001/83/Add.1 (Jan. 9, 2001) (by Gabriela Rodriguez Pizarro)) 
(discussing the best interests of the child principle in relation to the treat-
ment of unaccompanied minors in refugee and asylum law). 
 37. See M.S.S., App. No. 30696/09, ¶¶ 234, 250, 263–64; see also Conven-
tion on the Rights of the Child, Nov. 20, 1989, adopted by resolution 44/25, 
1577 U.N.T.S. 3; European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 34; 
Phillips, supra note 29. 
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the CRC and the ECHR. First, the Note proposes the elimina-
tion of all conflicts of interest in the care of unaccompanied mi-
nors entering Greece. Second, it calls for the EU’s actual execu-
tion of the “best interests of the child” principle through the 
prohibition of child detention and a mandate for alternatives 
that are sensitive to children’s vulnerability and foster a sense 
of trust. Finally, the Note concludes with final recommenda-
tions for both the EU and Greece. 
I. BACKGROUND 
Unaccompanied minors flee to the EU and enter through 
Greece for a variety of reasons, from persecution, to violence 
and child exploitation.38  As a result of their migration into 
Greece, and in accordance with the CRC and the ECHR, Greece 
is bound by international law to certain minimal levels of 
treatment of unaccompanied minors.39 
A. Why Unaccompanied Minors Flee to Greece 
The European Council defines an “unaccompanied minor” as 
follows: 
a minor who arrives on the territory of the Members States unac-
companied by an adult responsible for him or her whether by law or 
by the practice of the Member State concerned, and for as long as he 
or she is not effectively taken into the care of such person; it includes 
a minor who is left unaccompanied after he or she has entered the 
territory of the Member States.40 
                                                                                                             
 38. Bhabha, supra note 4, at 288; see HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, LEFT TO 
SURVIVE, supra note 18, at 11. 
 39. See generally Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 37; 
European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 34. See also Convention 
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, COUNCIL OF 
EUR., 
http://conventions.coe.int/treaty/Commun/ChercheSig.asp?NT=005&CM=&D
F=&CL=ENG (last visited Dec. 1, 2013); Status of the Convention on the 
Rights of the Child, U.N. TREATY COLLECTION, 
http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-
11&chapter=4&lang=en (last visited Dec. 1, 2013). 
 40. Council Directive 2013/33 of 26 June 2013 Laying Down Standards for 
the Reception of Applicants for International Protection (Recast), art. 2(e), 
2013 O.J. (L 180) 96, 99 [hereinafter Reception Conditions Directive]. Greece 
has defined an unaccompanied minor as: 
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There are many reasons why minors migrate to Greece unac-
companied. Many minors travel alone because they are fleeing 
violence after their families have been murdered in their home 
countries or have disappeared.41 Other children have been sep-
arated from their families with whom they initially left joint-
ly.42 On the other hand, many minors leave to escape various 
forms of exploitation specific to children, such as child labor43 
and “forced military recruitment.”44 In some cases, such as is 
common among many Afghan children, minors purportedly flee 
their nation for countries like Iran, but eventually leave these 
states due to poor working conditions and crackdowns on ille-
gal immigration.45 In other circumstances, unaccompanied mi-
nors arrive in Greece alone having fled refugee camps because 
they were violently targeted due to factors such as their fami-
lies’ political affiliations.46 
                                                                                                             
a third-country national or stateless person below the age of 18, who 
either enters on Greek territory unaccompanied by an adult respon-
sible for him whether by law or custom, and for as long as he is not 
effectively taken into the care of such a person or a minor who is left 
unaccompanied after he has entered the country. 
Nomos (2005:3386) Codification of Legislation on the Entry, Residence and 
Social Integration of Third-Country Nationals on Greek Territory, EPHEMERIS 
TES KYVERNESEOS TES HELLENIKES DEMOKRATIAS [E.K.E.D.] 2005, A:212, art. 
1(i) (Greece), available at 
http://www.mfa.gr/images/docs/ethnikes_theoriseis/codification_of_legislation
_en.pdf (last visited Jan. 14, 2013) (codifying the first version of the EU’s Re-
ception Conditions Directive, Council Directive 2003/9/EC, which was recent-
ly “recast”). 
 41. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, LEFT TO SURVIVE, supra note 18, at 11–12, 
29. 
 42. Id. at 11. 
 43. Id. at 11–12. 
 44. UNHCR, UNACCOMPANIED MINORS SEEKING ASYLUM IN GREECE 14 
(2008), available at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/48abd557d.html (by 
Georgia Dimitropoulou & Ioannis Papageorgiou) [hereinafter UNHCR, 
UNACCOMPANIED MINORS]. 
 45. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, LEFT TO SURVIVE, supra note 18, at 11. Unac-
companied minors who have entered the EU irregularly, either clandestinely 
by land or sea or with false travel documents, do not obtain regular status if 
they do not seek asylum or, alternatively, if their asylum applications are 
rejected. Id. at 41. 
 46. Id. at 12. 
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Unaccompanied minors flood Greece for many of the same 
reasons as adults:47 in pursuit of asylum applications, a chance 
at new economic opportunities, and often as a means to contin-
ue on to other EU nations.48 They are commonly compelled to 
leave their nations of origin because of persecution due to reli-
gious or political views,49  violence,50  oppression under dicta-
torial regimes,51 and general political turmoil.52 
Consequently, the EU attracts many migrants because of the 
“prosperity and political stability” of its nations.53 Greece, in 
particular, has received a large influx of migrants, including 
unaccompanied minors, due to its porous borders.54 Specifical-
ly, until 2012, approximately two-thirds55 of all irregular mi-
grants destined for the EU entered through Greece’s 130-mile 
northeastern border with Turkey,56 in the Evros region.57 More 
recently, after Greece tightened border controls and construct-
                                                                                                             
 47. UNHCR, UNACCOMPANIED MINORS, supra note 44, at 14. 
 48. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, LEFT TO SURVIVE, supra note 18, at 2, 4, 41–42; 
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, TURNED AWAY: SUMMARY RETURNS OF UNACCOMPANIED 
MIGRANT CHILDREN AND ASYLUM SEEKERS FROM ITALY TO GREECE 11–12 
(2013), available at 
http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/italy0113ForUpload_0.pdf 
[hereinafter HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, TURNED AWAY]; Stevis, New Crisis for 
Greece, supra note 6; UNHCR, PROTECTING CHILDREN ON THE MOVE 10 (2012), 
available at 
http://www.unhcr.it/cms/attach/editor/PDF/Protecting%20children%20on%20
the%20move%202012.pdf [hereinafter UNHCR, PROTECTING CHILDREN ON 
THE MOVE]. 
 49. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, LEFT TO SURVIVE, supra note 18, at 11–12. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Greece Cracks Down on Illegal Immigration amid Financial Crisis, 
supra note 7. 
 52. See Stevis, New Crisis for Greece, supra note 6. 
 53. DIRECTORATE-GEN. FOR COMM’N, EUR. COMM’N, AN OPPORTUNITY AND A 
CHALLENGE: MIGRATION IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 5 (2009), available at 
http://bookshop.europa.eu/is-bin/INTERSHOP.enfinity/WFS/EU-Bookshop-
Site/en_GB/-/EUR/ViewPublication-Start?PublicationKey=NA7808857. 
 54. Stevis, New Crisis for Greece, supra note 6; see also Annual Report 
2013: Greece, supra note 18; UNHCR, UNACCOMPANIED MINORS, supra note 
44, at 4. 
 55. Greece Cracks Down on Illegal Immigration amid Financial Crisis, 
supra note 7. 
 56. Id. 
 57. See Amnesty Int’l, Enter at Your Peril, supra note 23, at 3. 
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ed a 10.5-kilometer fence58 aimed at deterring irregular migra-
tion, migrants have been traveling instead by sea, in particular 
across the Aegean Sea, and arriving in the Greek islands.59 
Sources show that such irregular migrants originate from a 
wide range of countries in North Africa, Asia, and the Middle 
East, including Afghanistan, Pakistan, Bangladesh,60 Somalia, 
Sudan,61 and in more recent years, Syria,62 due to the country’s 
current civil war.63 With the recent political developments in 
the Middle East, Greece expects a renewed surge in its illegal 
immigration problems.64 
B. Legally Binding International Law Governing Greece’s 
Treatment of Unaccompanied Minors 
In the treatment of unaccompanied minors within its juris-
diction, Greece is bound by both the CRC and the ECHR.65 
Both treaties codify certain minimum rights that shall be pre-
                                                                                                             
 58. This fence was constructed in a 10.5 kilometer-long area of the Greece-
Turkey border that “does not follow the course of the Evros River” and that 
up until the construction of this fence “used to be one of the busiest transit 
points for irregular migration to Europe.” Id. While significantly decreasing 
the numbers of irregular migrants that enter Greece through this particular 
border, the migration flow continues. Id. 
 59. Id.; Christina Flora, Mass Arrival of Illegal Immigrants Through Sea, 
GREEK REP. (Aug. 28, 2013), http://greece.greekreporter.com/2013/08/28/mass-
arrival-of-illegal-immigrants-through-sea/; Press Release, Amnesty Int’l, Two 
Boat Tragedies Leave Migrants Dead and Missing off Europe’s Shores, AI 
Index PRE01/367/2013 (July 25, 2013), available at 
http://www.amnesty.org/en/for-media/press-releases/two-boat-tragedies-leave-
migrants-dead-and-missing-europe-s-shores-2013-07-. 
 60. Greece Cracks Down on Illegal Immigration amid Financial Crisis, 
supra note 7. 
 61. Stevis, New Crisis for Greece, supra note 6. 
 62. “Greece recorded the entry of 15,072 Syrian nationals between Janu-
ary 2011 and the end of September 2013, but only 833 asylum applications 
through the end of July.” Human Rights Watch, EU: Improve Migrant Res-
cue, supra note 24 (emphasis added). 
 63. Greece Cracks Down on Illegal Immigration amid Financial Crisis, 
supra note 7; Stevis, New Crisis for Greece, supra note 6. 
 64. Flora, supra note 59. 
 65. See Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms, supra note 39; Status of the Convention on the Rights of the Child, 
supra note 39. 
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served for both children and individuals in general, respective-
ly.66 
1. United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child 
In 1989, the world’s leaders recognized that children’s rights 
needed acknowledgement and increased protection.67 Concerns 
driven by “alarming accounts . . . of children in prison and in 
other difficult circumstances” necessitated the creation of an 
instrument to protect children’s rights that would be binding 
under international law.68 As a result, the CRC was drafted 
and became a legally binding treaty on its 140 signatory na-
tions.69 Greece is one of those nations and ratified the CRC in 
1993.70 The CRC’s preamble is particularly significant in the 
context of the treatment of unaccompanied minors in Greece. 
Specifically, the preamble notes that children throughout the 
world are living in “exceptionally difficult conditions,” and be-
cause of a child’s “physical and mental immaturity,” a child 
                                                                                                             
 66. Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 37; European Con-
vention on Human Rights, supra note 34; see also Convention for the Protec-
tion of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, supra note 39; European 
Court of Human Rights, CHILD RIGHTS INT’L NETWORK, 
http://www.crin.org/resources/infoDetail.asp?ID=18061&flag=report (The 
ECHR “sets out the civil and political rights and freedoms that European 
States agree to ensure for people living within their jurisdiction.”); Status of 
the Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 39. See generally Ann 
Laquer Estin, Families and Children in International Law: An Introduction, 
12 TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 271, 292–94 (2002) (noting the CRC’s 
“comprehensive” nature in setting out rights that address the protection of 
children in “economic, social, and cultural” aspects). 
 67. Introduction: Convention on the Rights of the Child, UNICEF, 
http://www.unicef.org/crc/ (last updated Apr. 4, 2013); see also Cynthia Price 
Cohen, The Developing Jurisprudence of the Rights of the Child, 6 ST. 
THOMAS L. REV. 1, 1 (1993). 
 68. Office of the U.N. High Comm’r for Human Rights [OHCHR], Fact 
Sheet No.10 (Rev. 1), The Rights of the Child, available at 
http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/FactSheet10Rev.1en.pdf (last 
visited Oct. 23, 2013) [hereinafter OHCHR, Fact Sheet No.10]. 
 69. See Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 37, pmbl. (listing 
as one of the rationales behind the adoption of the treaty that “the child, by 
reason of his physical and mental immaturity, needs special safeguards and 
care, including appropriate legal protection, before as well as after birth”); see 
also Introduction: Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 67; Sta-
tus of the Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 39. 
 70. Introduction: Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 67; 
Status of the Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 39. 
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needs “special safeguards and care.”71 The CRC specifically in-
tended these safeguards to include protection in a legal con-
text.72 Consequently, the convention has established minimum 
standards that parties to the instrument are obliged to imple-
ment in order to achieve these objectives.73 The Committee on 
the Rights of the Child was established to monitor the CRC’s 
implementation.74 
The most significant standard the convention advocates is 
the proposition that the child’s best interests serve as “a prima-
ry consideration” in any action undertaken regarding a child, 
whether by a public or private entity.75 The CRC specifically 
addresses children who are seeking refugee status, whether 
unaccompanied or not, noting that state parties must ensure 
that these minors “receive appropriate protection and humani-
tarian assistance.”76 The convention also states that children 
                                                                                                             
 71. Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 37, pmbl. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Introduction: Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 67. 
 74. Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 37, art. 43(1); see 
also Committee on the Rights of the Child, OFFICE OF THE U.N. HIGH COMM’R 
FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/crc/ (last visited 
Sept. 20, 2012). The Committee on the Rights of the Child is made up of in-
dependent experts who review reports submitted regularly by the Conven-
tion’s parties, outlining the process of the implementation of the rights pro-
tected by the CRC. Committee on the Rights of the Child, supra. One of the 
goals of the committee is ensuring that state parties are “undertak[ing] . . . 
appropriate legislative, administrative and other measures to implement the 
Convention,” pursuant to Article 4 of the Convention. OHCHR, Fact Sheet 
No.10, supra note 68. The committee strives to achieve compliance by making 
certain that states’ legislation is consistent with the Convention, by gathering 
information about children and their situations, and by promoting coopera-
tion in the international arena. Id. Although the committee refers complaints 
about violations of a child’s rights to other international human rights treaty 
bodies, the committee intends to accept children’s individual complaints in 
the near future. Committee on the Rights of the Child, supra. See generally 
Cohen, supra note 67, at 5–6. 
 75. Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 37, art. 3(1); see also 
Cohen, supra note 67, at 19. 
 76. The CRC provides: 
States Parties shall take appropriate measures to ensure that a child 
who is seeking refugee status or who is considered a refugee in ac-
cordance with applicable international or domestic law and proce-
dures shall, whether unaccompanied or accompanied by his or her 
parents or by any other person, receive appropriate protection and 
humanitarian assistance in the enjoyment of applicable rights set 
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have a right to acceptable standards of living that promote 
their “physical, mental, spiritual, moral and social develop-
ment.”77 Finally, the CRC expressly addresses the detention of 
children: the convention prohibits the “torture or other cruel, 
inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment” of children 
and their unlawful and arbitrary deprivation of liberty.78 It 
proceeds by stating that detention of a child should only occur 
as a last resort and, even under those circumstances, only for 
the shortest possible duration.79 
2. European Convention on Human Rights 
By detaining unaccompanied minors, Greece is also in viola-
tion of the ECHR. The ECHR was signed in Rome on November 
4, 1950, by the member states of the Council of Europe,80 in-
cluding Greece.81 The convention lays out a number of basic 
human rights and freedoms82 and is binding on all member na-
tions, both on a national and international level.83 Thus, the 
ECHR is encompassed in the municipal legislation of state par-
ties and must be applied by domestic courts.84 Specifically, and 
                                                                                                             
forth in the present Convention and in other international human 
rights or humanitarian instruments to which the said States are 
Parties. 
Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 37, art. 22(1). 
 77. Id. art. 27(1). 
 78. Id. art. 37(a)–(b); see also Cara L. Finan, Convention on the Rights of 
the Child: A Potentially Effective Remedy in Cases of Child Abduction, 34 
SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1007, 1023 (1994). 
 79. Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 37, art. 37(b). 
 80. The Council of Europe is an international organization, comprised of 
forty-seven member states, including the twenty-seven member states of the 
EU. The Council of Europe in Brief: Do Not Get Confused, COUNCIL OF EUR., 
http://www.coe.int/aboutCoe/index.asp?page=nepasconfondre&l=en (last vis-
ited Dec. 1, 2013). “No country has ever joined the EU without first belonging 
to the Council of Europe.” Id. The Council was established in order “to pro-
mote democracy and protect human rights.” Id. 
 81. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms, supra note 39. Greece ratified the ECHR in 1974. 
 82. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms: Summary of the Treaty, COUNCIL OF EUR., 
http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Summaries/Html/005.htm (last visited 
Sept. 20, 2012). 
 83. The ECHR in 50 Questions, EUR. CT. OF HUMAN RIGHTS 3 (July 2012), 
http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/50Questions_ENG.pdf. 
 84. Id. 
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of particular relevance to the detention of unaccompanied mi-
nors in Greece, the ECHR provides that “[n]o one shall be sub-
jected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or pun-
ishment.”85 The European Court of Human Rights enforces the 
ECHR.86 
II. GREECE’S TREATMENT OF UNACCOMPANIED MINORS 
VIOLATES BINDING INTERNATIONAL LAW 
In M.S.S. v. Belgium & Greece, the European Court of Hu-
man Rights held that Greece’s treatment of irregular migrants 
violated binding international law.87 Greece continues to vio-
late the rights of irregular migrants, including unaccompanied 
minors, post-M.S.S. by detaining and exposing them to inhu-
mane and degrading treatment. 88  Nevertheless, many of 
Greece’s problems with overcrowding and poor detention condi-
tions are a consequence of regulations imposed by the EU that 
Greece must abide by.89 This suggests that perhaps the best 
way to bring Greece into compliance with international law is 
to address the problem of the detention of unaccompanied mi-
nors primarily at the EU level. 
A. The Impact of M.S.S. v. Belgium & Greece 
On January 21, 2011, in the case of M.S.S. v. Belgium & 
Greece, the European Court of Human Rights found that 
Greece was in violation of its international law obligations un-
                                                                                                             
 85. European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 34, art. 3. 
 86. Individual claimants may bring a cause of action against a state that 
has violated their fundamental rights in the European Court of Human 
Rights. The ECHR in 50 Questions, supra note 83, at 6. If the court finds a 
violation, it will issue a judgment against the violating party and demand 
that it modify its conduct and/or legislation to comply with the Convention. 
Id. at 10. A judgment is binding on all parties and is enforced by the Commit-
tee of Ministers of the Council of Europe. Id. at 9. This committee oversees 
execution of the court’s judgments and consults with the relevant states to 
ensure execution and to prevent further violations. Id. at 10. 
 87. See generally M.S.S. v. Belgium & Greece, App. No. 30696/09 (Eur. Ct. 
H.R. Jan. 21, 2011), available at 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-103050. 
 88. Annual Report 2013: Greece, supra note 18; HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, 
TURNED AWAY, supra note 48, at 18–24; Stevis, New Crisis for Greece, supra 
note 6. See generally HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, LEFT TO SURVIVE, supra note 18. 
 89. See Dublin II Regulation, supra note 10; see also Coll, supra note 10; 
KOK, supra note 10, at 12. 
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der the ECHR.90 In M.S.S., the court adjudged the legality of 
Greece’s detention practices regarding irregular migrants. 91 
The case was brought by an Afghan national who had left Ka-
bul, primarily due to the high unemployment that pervaded the 
region, and entered the EU through Greece where he was brief-
ly detained.92  However, M.S.S. did not apply for asylum in 
Greece.93 Rather, he continued on to Belgium and applied for 
asylum there.94 After an examination proved that M.S.S. had 
first entered the EU though Greece, Belgium requested that 
Greece take responsibility for M.S.S.’s asylum application in 
accordance with Dublin II.95 Eventually, the applicant was re-
turned to Greece where he was once again detained.96 Subse-
quently, M.S.S. brought an action alleging that his removal to 
Greece by Belgian authorities had violated both Articles 2 and 
3 of the ECHR.97 He also alleged that Greece’s treatment of 
him amounted to a violation of Article 3.98 
                                                                                                             
 90. See M.S.S., App. No. 30696/09; see also Gruberg, supra note 5, at 540. 
 91. M.S.S., App. No. 30696/09, ¶¶ 3, 161–72. 
 92. Id. ¶¶ 9–10. See generally Patricia Mallia, Introductory Note to the Eu-
ropean Court of Human Rights: M.S.S. v. Belgium & Greece, 50 I.L.M. 364, 
364 (2011). 
 93. M.S.S., App. No. 30696/09, ¶ 10 (Arriving in Greece, the applicant 
“was detained for a week and, when released, was issued with an order to 
leave the country. He did not apply for asylum in Greece.”); see also Ton 
Zuijdwijk, M.S.S. v. Belgium & Greece (European Court of Human Rights): 
The Interplay Between European Union Law and the European Convention on 
Human Rights in the Post-Lisbon Era, 39 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 807, 808 
(2011) (discussing the new implications of M.S.S. v. Belgium & Greece regard-
ing the effects of the ECHR on EU member states’ actions). 
 94. M.S.S., App. No. 30696/09, ¶ 11. 
 95. Id. ¶¶ 12, 14. 
 96. Id. ¶¶ 33, 44. 
 97. Id. ¶¶ 323, 362; see also Zuijdwijk, supra note 93, at 815. 
 98. M.S.S., App. No. 30696/09, ¶ 205. The court emphasized: 
Article 3 of the Convention requires the State to ensure that deten-
tion conditions are compatible with respect for human dignity, that 
the manner and method of the execution of the measure do not sub-
ject the detainees to distress or hardship of an intensity exceeding 
the unavoidable level of suffering inherent in detention, and that, 
given the practical demands of imprisonment, their health and well-
being are adequately secured. 
Id. ¶ 221; see also Zuijdwijk, supra note 93, at 815. 
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M.S.S. complained of detention conditions that are typical of 
the crisis in Greece.99 For example, he complained of being de-
tained “in a small room with twenty other people,” with limited 
access to toilet facilities and “very little to eat,” and of ill 
treatment by Greek police.100 The court noted that the appli-
cant’s descriptions of the conditions he endured while in deten-
tion matched findings by several organizations on the condi-
tions in detention centers holding irregular migrants through-
out Greece.101 
                                                                                                             
 99. M.S.S., App. No. 30696/09, ¶¶ 44, 160, 206. The applicant “described 
his conditions of detention, alleging that he had been beaten by the police 
officers in charge of the centre, and said that he wanted to get out of Greece 
at any cost so as not to have to live in such difficult conditions.” Id. For ex-
amples of how M.S.S.’s detention conditions mirror those throughout Greece, 
see, e.g., Amnesty Int’l, Enter at Your Peril, supra note 23, at 7; Amnesty 
Int’l, Greece: Irregular Migrants and Asylum-Seekers Routinely Detained in 
Substandard Conditions, AI Index EUR 25/002/2010 (July 2010), available at 
http://s3.amazonaws.com/rcpp/assets/attachments/1062_amnesty_greece_201
0_original.pdf [hereinafter Amnesty Int’l, Routinely Detained in Substandard 
Conditions]; Amnesty Int’l, No Place for an Asylum-Seeker in Greece, 
AMNESTY INT’L (Feb. 28, 2008, 2:23 PM), 
http://www.amnesty.org.au/news/comments/9711/; Human Rights Watch, 
Greece: Unsafe and Unwelcoming Shores, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (Oct. 12, 
2009), http://www.hrw.org/news/2009/10/09/greece-unsafe-and-unwelcoming-
shores; HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, LEFT TO SURVIVE, supra note 18, at 53–62; 
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, STUCK IN A REVOLVING DOOR, supra note 27, at 83–85; 
SPYROS KOULOCHERIS, GREEK COUNCIL FOR REFUGEES, NATIONAL COUNTRY 
REPORT: GREECE 49–51, available at 
http://www.asylumineurope.org/files/report-
download/aida_greekreport_june2013_0.pdf (last updated Jun. 1, 2013); Ob-
servations on Greece as a Country of Asylum, OFFICE OF THE U.N. HIGH 
COMM’R FOR REFUGEES (Dec. 2009), 
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4b4b3fc82.html. 
 100. M.S.S., App. No. 30696/09, ¶ 206; see also Zuijdwijk, supra note 93, at 
811. 
 101. Describing one center in particular that held detained irregular mi-
grants, the court noted: 
According to the findings made by organisations that visited the 
holding centre next to the airport, the sector for asylum seekers was 
rarely unlocked and the detainees had no access to the water foun-
tain outside and were obliged to drink water from the toilets. In the 
sector for arrested persons, there were 145 detainees in a 100 sq. m 
space. In a number of cells there was only one bed for fourteen to 
seventeen people. There were not enough mattresses and a number 
of detainees were sleeping on the bare floor. There was insufficient 
room for all the detainees to lie down and sleep at the same time. 
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The decision by the European Court of Human Rights is sig-
nificant for several reasons. First, the court noted that the EU’s 
Reception Conditions Directive,102 which supplements Dublin 
II, requires certain minimum standards of member states for 
the reception of asylum seekers, including food, clothing, ade-
quate medical care, and even education for minors.103 Second, 
the court recognized the particularly “profound effect” such de-
grading and inhumane treatment in detention can have on in-
dividuals in such a vulnerable state (for example, asylum seek-
ers).104 The court stressed the significance of M.S.S.’s asylum 
seeker status.105 Third, the court acknowledged the especially 
                                                                                                             
Because of the overcrowding, there was a lack of sufficient ventila-
tion and the cells were unbearably hot. Detainees’ access to the toi-
lets was severely restricted and they complained that the police 
would not let them out into the corridors. The police admitted that 
the detainees had to urinate in plastic bottles which they emptied 
when they were allowed to use the toilets. It was observed in all sec-
tors that there was no soap or toilet paper, that sanitary and other 
facilities were dirty, that the sanitary facilities had no doors and the 
detainees were deprived of outdoor exercise. 
M.S.S., App. No. 30696/09, ¶ 230; see also Gruberg, supra note 5, at 540. See 
generally Human Rights Watch, Greece: End Inhumane Detention Conditions 
for Migrants, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (Dec. 6, 2010), 
http://www.hrw.org/news/2010/12/06/greece-end-inhumane-detention-
conditions-migrants; HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, LEFT TO SURVIVE, supra note 18; 
Human Rights Watch, No Refuge: Migrants in Greece, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH 
(Nov. 2, 2009), http://www.hrw.org/print/reports/2009/11/02/no-refugess. 
 102. Reception Conditions Directive, supra note 40. 
 103. M.S.S., App. No. 30696/09, ¶ 84; Reception Conditions Directive, supra 
note 40, art. 2, 14, 18–19, at 99, 104–06. 
 104. M.S.S., App. No. 30696/09, ¶ 233. Further emphasizing the impact of 
the deplorable conditions on M.S.S., the court stated: 
[T]he Court considers that the conditions of detention experienced 
by the applicant were unacceptable. It considers that, taken togeth-
er, the feeling of arbitrariness and the feeling of inferiority and anxi-
ety often associated with it, as well as the profound effect such condi-
tions of detention indubitably have on a person’s dignity, constitute 
degrading treatment contrary to Article 3 of the Convention. In addi-
tion, the applicant’s distress was accentuated by the vulnerability 
inherent in his situation as an asylum seeker.  
Id. (emphasis added). 
 105. Id. ¶ 251 (“The Court attaches considerable importance to the appli-
cant’s status as an asylum seeker and, as such, a member of a particularly 
underprivileged and vulnerable population group in need of special protec-
tion.”). 
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burdensome influx of migrants that member states along the 
EU’s external borders are facing due to their geographic loca-
tions.106 Finally, despite this recognition, the court ultimately 
found that these burdens did not excuse said states from their 
obligations.107 The court found Greece in violation of Article 3 of 
the ECHR and Belgium also in violation of Article 3 for return-
ing the applicant back to Greece where he was exposed to con-
ditions amounting to inhumane and degrading treatment.108 
Importantly, the court noted that asylum seekers should not be 
transferred to other states where their fundamental rights as 
laid out in the ECHR could be violated (i.e., to Greece).109 The 
court awarded the applicant reparation to be paid by both 
states and ordered Greece to stay M.S.S.’s deportation until a 
proper examination of the merits of his asylum application was 
completed.110 
Despite this binding decision handed down by the court, 
Greece continues to violate its international obligations in its 
treatment of detained unaccompanied minors, subjecting them 
                                                                                                             
 106. The court admitted that EU border states undergo 
considerable difficulties in coping with the increasing influx of mi-
grants and asylum seekers. The situation is exacerbated by the 
transfers of asylum seekers by other Member States in application of 
the Dublin Regulation. . . . The Court does not underestimate the 
burden and pressure this situation places on the States concerned, 
which are all the greater in the present context of economic crisis. It 
is particularly aware of the difficulties involved in the reception of 
migrants and asylum seekers . . . and of the disproportionate num-
ber of asylum seekers when compared to the capacities of some of 
these States. 
Id. ¶ 223; see also Mallia, supra note 92, at 365. 
 107. M.S.S., App. No. 30696/09, ¶¶ 223–27; Mallia, supra note 92, at 365. 
 108. M.S.S., App. No. 30696/09, ¶¶ 233–34, 367–68; see also Gruberg, supra 
note 5, at 540; Mallia, supra note 92, at 365; Zuijdwijk, supra note 93, at 815. 
 109. M.S.S., App. No. 30696/09, ¶¶ 77–79, 332, 350. The EU’s judicial sys-
tem has come to similar conclusions in other decisions. For example, in a De-
cember 2011 case, the European Court of Justice (“ECJ”) ruled that the Unit-
ed Kingdom and Ireland could not return asylum seekers to Greece, stating 
“an asylum seeker may not be transferred to a member state where he risks 
being subjected to inhuman treatment.” EU Court Warns UK and Irish over 
Asylum Transfers, supra note 12 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 110. M.S.S., App. No. 30696/09, ¶¶ 402, 406, 411, 414, 420, 423. Of the 
damages that Greece and Belgium were ordered to pay the applicant, the 
largest amount awarded by the court did not exceed €25,000, while the lowest 
totaled €1,000. Id. 
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to conditions similar to those described in the case of M.S.S. v. 
Belgium & Greece.111 Such treatment not only violates obliga-
                                                                                                             
 111. Annual Report 2012: Greece, AMNESTY INT’L, 
http://www.amnesty.org/en/region/greece/report-2012 (last visited Jan. 6, 
2013); Annual Report 2013: Greece, supra note 18; Greece Condemned for De-
tention of Unaccompanied Children, ASYLUM INFO. DATABASE (Oct. 25, 2013), 
http://www.asylumineurope.org/news/25-10-2013/greece-condemned-
detention-unaccompanied-children (discussing the October 24, 2013 decision 
by the European Court of Human Rights in Housein v. Greece, ruling that 
Greece had violated an Afghan child’s rights under Articles 3 and 5(1) of the 
ECHR for arresting and detaining him in an adult detention center for two 
months after he had illegally crossed the border into Greece); KOULOCHERIS, 
supra note 99, at 49–51. For more examples of the continued practice of de-
tention of unaccompanied minors (and migrants in general) in Greece, see 
also Amnesty Int’l, Enter at Your Peril, supra note 23, at 7; Amnesty Int’l, 
Greece Must Halt Mass Police Crackdown on Irregular Migrants, AMNESTY 
INT’L (Aug. 8, 2012), http://www.amnestyusa.org/news/news-item/greece-
must-halt-mass-police-crackdown-on-irregular-migrants; Eva Cossé, Dis-
patches: Greece—One Year On, Abuses Continue under Operation Xenios 
Zeus, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (Aug. 2, 2013), 
http://www.hrw.org/news/2013/08/02/dispatches-greece-one-year-abuses-
continue-under-operation-xenios-zeus (Operation Xenios Zeus has been an 
effort “aim[ed] at cracking down on irregular migration and crime in Athens,”  
lasting over a year. The Operation has led to “abusive stops” and “hours-long 
detention” of “tens of thousands of people presumed to be undocumented mi-
grants.”); Court: Greece’s Treatment of Asylum Seeker Breached Human 
Rights Law, HUMAN RIGHTS EUROPE, 
http://www.humanrightseurope.org/2013/08/court-greece%E2%80%99s-
treatment-of-asylum-seeker-breached-human-rights-law/ (Aug. 1, 2013) (dis-
cussing an August 2013 decision by the European Court of Human Rights 
finding that Greece once again violated Article 3 of the ECHR due to the de-
tention conditions an asylum seeker was exposed to in Greek police stations); 
Andy Dabilis, Amnesty Says Greece’s Migrant Treatment Inhumane, GREEK 
REP. (Dec. 20, 2012), http://greece.greekreporter.com/2012/12/20/amnesty-
says-greeces-migrant-treatment-inhumane/; ECJ Rules Against Greece over 
Detention Standards, EKATHIMERINI (Dec. 4, 2012, 9:35 PM), 
http://www.ekathimerini.com/4dcgi/_w_articles_wsite1_1_04/12/2012_472957 
(The ECJ has ruled that Greece is not meeting minimum standards for de-
tention.); Greece—“An Unsafe Environment for Migrants,” IRIN (Aug. 17, 
2012), http://www.irinnews.org/report/96123/MIGRATION-Greece-an-unsafe-
environment-for-migrants; Greece: Halt Mass Migrant Round-Ups, supra 
note 21; Migrants Protest Detention Conditions in Komotini, EKATHIMERINI 
(Nov. 23, 2012, 8:26 PM), 
http://www.ekathimerini.com/4dcgi/_w_articles_wsite1_1_23/11/2012_471405; 
Paphitis, supra note 7; Smith, supra note 6; Stevis, New Crisis for Greece, 
supra note 6 (describing detention centers conditions “as extremely poor, with 
immigrants reporting unbearable overcrowding, limited access to toilets and 
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tions under the ECHR, but also constitutes a violation of the 
CRC, which calls for detention of minors only in exceptional 
circumstances and as a last resort.112 Furthermore, the inhu-
mane and degrading treatment and punishment of unaccom-
panied minors and the failure to provide them with appropriate 
protection also violates basic principles of the CRC.113 
B. Dublin II’s Contribution to Greece’s Violations 
Greece’s obligations under the EU’s Dublin II exacerbate the 
conditions of detention within the state. Dublin II114 was estab-
lished in order to outline the criteria by which it could be easily 
determined which member state is responsible for the exami-
nation of a migrant’s asylum application.115 Typically, the asy-
lum application of an unaccompanied minor must be examined 
by the member state in which the application was lodged.116 
However, it is not uncommon for unaccompanied minors to be 
incorrectly identified as adults due to cursory age assessments 
by police and immigration officials.117 As a result, the examina-
                                                                                                             
little food”). See generally M.S.S., App. No. 30696/09, ¶¶ 34, 44, 159–66, 206, 
222. 
 112. Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 37, art. 37(b). 
 113. Id. art. 20(1), 22(1). 
 114. The objective of Dublin II is to avoid a situation in which asylum seek-
ers are “being sent from one country to another” and to “prevent abuse of the 
system by the submission of several applications for asylum by one person.” 
Dublin II Regulation, EUROPA, 
http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/justice_freedom_security/free_movem
ent_of_persons_asylum_immigration/l33153_en.htm (last updated Nov. 18, 
2011) [hereinafter Dublin II Regulation, EUROPA]. 
 115. Id. 
 116. Dublin II Regulation, supra note 10, art. 6, at 4. 
 117. EUR. MIGRATION NETWORK, UNACCOMPANIED MINORS—AN EU 
COMPARATIVE STUDY 6, 49–50, 52, available at 
http://www.ab.gov.tr/files/ardb/evt/1_avrupa_birligi/1_9_politikalar/1_9_8_dis
_politika/Policies_on_reception_return_and_integration_for_and_numbers_of
_unaccompanied_minors.pdf (last visited Oct. 23, 2013) (discussing the possi-
bility that “a minor is incorrectly age-assessed to be an adult”); see also Laura 
Brownlees & Terry Smith, Age Assessment Practices: A Literature Review & 
Annotated Bibliography, UNICEF 1 (Apr. 2011), http://origin-
www.unicef.org/protection/files/Age_Assessment_Practices_2010.pdf (noting 
that children without documents to prove their age and subjected to arbitrary 
age determinations are “vulnerable to being treated as an adult . . . when 
seeking international protection as asylum seekers,” and that such inaccu-
rate identification can have “life-changing consequences”); SANDY RUXTON, 
SEPARATED CHILDREN IN EUR. PROGRAMME, SEPARATED CHILDREN SEEKING 
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tion of such unaccompanied minors’ applications is governed by 
Dublin II rules regulating the asylum applications of adults. 
Under these circumstances, if an individual is found to have 
entered irregularly, the member state where that individual 
first entered the EU is responsible for examining his or her 
asylum application. 118  Therefore, even if an application is 
lodged in another country, the unaccompanied minor may be 
forced to return to Greece where his or her application will by 
default be examined by Greek officials. 
Dublin II’s requirements result in a great imbalance in the 
number of applicants found within the various EU member 
states.119 This is not merely because Dublin II provides that 
states may return irregular migrants to the state through 
which they initially entered the EU, but also because of the 
particularly heavy burden it places on states located on the 
EU’s external borders. 120  Thus, Greece’s geographic location 
also plays an important role in aggravating conditions.121 The 
imbalance places a strain on Greece that compounds the condi-
tions of detention because of the sheer volumes of migrants 
flooding the country.122 As a result, any unaccompanied minor 
                                                                                                             
ASYLUM IN EUROPE: A PROGRAMME FOR ACTION 10, available at 
http://scep.sitespirit.nl/images/17/189.pdf (“Separated children frequently 
arrive in Europe with false documents or no documents at all. . . . As a result 
it can prove difficult to ascertain their age, and if they are incorrectly identi-
fied as adults, they will not be entitled to the full protection of international 
law.”); UNHCR, PROTECTING CHILDREN ON THE MOVE, supra note 48, at 17. 
 118. Dublin II Regulation, supra note 10, art. 10(1), at 5. 
 119. See generally KOK, supra note 10; PAUL MCDONOUGH ET AL., EUR. 
COUNCIL ON REFUGEES & EXILES, SHARING RESPONSIBILITY FOR REFUGEE 
PROTECTION IN EUROPE: DUBLIN RECONSIDERED 16 (2008), available at 
www.ecre.org/component/downloads/downloads/105.html . 
 120. For a discussion of the pressures placed on the EU’s external border 
states with regard to migration, see generally Coll, supra note 10; KOK, supra 
note 10; MCDONOUGH ET AL., supra note 119. 
 121. Smith, supra note 6. 
 122. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, STUCK IN A REVOLVING DOOR, supra note 27, 
at 27 (“[T]he EU [has] exacerbated the lack of international solidarity and 
burden sharing by using the Dublin system to shift its own internal burden to 
Greece as the entry-point to the EU for [many migrants].”); Public Statement 
Concerning Greece, supra note 26, ¶ 12; Updated Human Rights Watch 
Submission to the U.N. Comm. Against Torture, on Greece, supra note 33; see 
also Smith, supra note 6 (discussing conditions prior to the construction of 
the anti-irregular migration fence in the Evros region of Greece where the 
country was then observing a “surge of new arrivals, with government figures 
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who is returned to Greece by another state, has applied for asy-
lum first in Greece, or is merely apprehended by Greek police 
and subsequently detained, will likely be subjected to deplora-
ble detention conditions. In addition, although the migration 
issue is a common problem that the EU as a whole faces, other 
member states are unwilling to share Greece’s migration bur-
den and are themselves opposed to welcoming mass influxes of 
migrants, thereby increasing the likelihood that irregulars will 
be sent back to the country of their original entry, often 
Greece.123 Consequently, conditions that the EU places on its 
member states demand a change to EU law. 
III. THE EU MUST TAKE RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE 
DETRIMENTAL CONSEQUENCES OF ITS REQUIREMENTS IMPOSED 
ON GREECE AND HELP GREECE TO ACHIEVE COMPLIANCE 
The finding by the European Court of Human Rights that 
Greece is violating international law and Greece’s continued 
violations124 signal that changes must be made. EU legislation 
is a significant factor in understanding why Greece has failed 
to comply with international law obligations regarding its re-
sponse to the influx of unaccompanied minor migrants. Greece 
is overburdened by the influx of migrants for a number of rea-
sons. As stated above in Part II.B, Dublin II requires that the 
member state in which the unaccompanied minor’s asylum ap-
plication was first lodged process that individual’s application, 
and that the applications of all other irregular migrants be pro-
cessed by the state in which the individual first entered the 
EU.125 This requirement, coupled with the EU’s “freedom of 
                                                                                                             
showing more than 100 migrants daily crossing the country’s porous border 
with Turkey.”). 
 123. Malkoutzis, supra note 8 (noting the “lack of interest” by other EU 
member states in contributing to the border control efforts in Greece); see also 
Caldwell, supra note 15; Pop, supra note 15; Scammell, supra note 15; Stevis, 
New Crisis for Greece, supra note 6 (“[Greece’s] failure to protect its border 
has only heightened political tensions at countries already resentful about 
the country’s impact on the euro, and worried that their own tight job mar-
kets can’t [sic] handle too many immigrants.”). 
 124. See generally M.S.S. v. Belgium & Greece, App. No. 30696/09, ¶ 401 
(Eur. Ct. H.R. Jan. 21, 2011), available at 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-103050; Annual 
Report 2013: Greece, supra note 18; Court: Greece’s Treatment of Asylum 
Seeker Breached Human Rights Law, supra note 111; Dabilis, supra note 111. 
 125. Dublin II Regulation, supra note 10, art. 6, 10(1), at 4–5. 
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movement policy” 126  and Greece’s geographic location,127  has 
rendered Greece an attractive entry point for unaccompanied 
minors and has placed a significant strain on the nation’s im-
migration and asylum system. 128  Due to the convenience of 
Greece as a route to the West and the country’s currently crip-
pled economy,129 Greece is abandoning binding principles of in-
ternational law and detaining unaccompanied minors, along 
with adults, in a “rounding-up” effort that often culminates in 
orders of deportation. 130  As a result of its requirements of 
Greece due to its irregular migration laws, the EU must take 
responsibility for helping Greece to comply with its interna-
tional obligations and amend its laws governing irregular mi-
gration.131 Furthermore, the EU should look to other nations 
that have sought to resolve the problem of detaining unaccom-
panied minors for alternative mechanisms that have proven 
successful in achieving compliance with international law as 
guidance. 
In exploring and establishing alternatives to detention, the 
EU must keep in mind two basic principles that are essential to 
creating a workable system of non-detention of unaccompanied 
minors and which take into account children’s vulnerability 
and needs. First, the EU must ensure that states receiving un-
                                                                                                             
 126. “The free movement of persons constitutes one of the fundamental 
freedoms of the internal market, which comprises an area without internal 
frontiers, in which freedom is ensured in accordance with the provisions of 
the Treaty.” Council Directive 2004/38/EC, 2004 O.J. (L 158) 77, 78. 
 127. Smith, supra note 6. 
 128. Id. 
 129. Paphitis, supra note 7 (“Greece’s severe economic problems and high 
unemployment are making the problem [of irregular migrants] worse than 
ever. . . . The uncontrolled influx, which coincided with a recent spike in 
crime, contributed to the sharp rise of an extreme-right political party which 
uses aggressive rhetoric against immigrants.”). 
 130. See Alice Farmer, The Impact of Immigration Detention on Children, 
FORCED MIGRATION REV., Sept. 2013, at 14, 14 [hereinafter Farmer, Impact of 
Immigration Detention]; HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, LEFT TO SURVIVE, supra note 
18, at 53; Paphitis, supra note 7; U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, COUNTRY REPORTS ON 
HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES FOR 2012: GREECE, 1, 4–5, 13, available at 
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/204503.pdf (last visited Sept. 
28, 2013). 
 131. Although a major cause of Greece’s problems, Dublin II serves an im-
portant role in “identify[ing] as quickly as possible the Member State respon-
sible for examining an asylum application” and “prevent[ing] abuse of asylum 
procedures.” Dublin II Regulation, EUROPA, supra note 114. 
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accompanied minors eradicate any conflict of interest with re-
gard to their care. This principle is essential to implementing 
the second criterion proposed which is that, in amending its 
laws, the EU must ensure that states are sensitive to the vul-
nerability of unaccompanied minors.132 These individuals, sub-
jected to detention, are not only minors who find themselves 
alone in a strange country, but are also often victims of war 
and other violence.133 In fostering awareness for their particu-
lar status, the EU must ensure that the widely accepted (and 
oft codified) “best interests of the child” principle134 is not simp-
ly a de jure doctrine, but is actually put into practice. This can 
only be accomplished by codifying a rule that completely pro-
scribes any detention of unaccompanied minors entering mem-
ber states and by proposing considerable and tangible conse-
quences if this prohibition is violated. It cannot reasonably be 
argued that detention in squalid and overcrowded centers 
among unrelated adults is in the “best interests” of a child 
when such a practice has been shown to aggravate preexisting 
mental and physical traumas resulting from circumstances 
that unaccompanied minors have sought to flee in the first 
place.135 In order to put the “best interests” principle into prac-
tice, the EU must mandate the establishment of alternatives to 
detention that foster trust between the minors and those re-
sponsible for their care. These alternatives have proven largely 
effective in precluding outcomes such as noncompliance and 
                                                                                                             
 132. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, LEFT TO SURVIVE, supra note 18, at 28–31, 73. 
 133. Id. at 11, 28–29. 
 134. “In all actions concerning children, whether undertaken by public or 
private social welfare institutions, courts of law, administrative authorities or 
legislative bodies, the best interests of the child shall be a primary considera-
tion.” Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 37, art. 3(1). See gen-
erally UNHCR, DETERMINING THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD 5 (2008), 
available at http://www.unhcr.org/4566b16b2.pdf (“The principle of the best 
interests of the child has been the subject of extensive consideration in aca-
demic, operational and other circles. Legal documents relating to the protec-
tion of children . . . systematically refer to it.”). 
 135. PHILIP AMARAL, JESUIT REFUGEE SERV. EUR., FROM DEPRIVATION TO 
LIBERTY: ALTERNATIVES TO DETENTION IN BELGIUM, GERMANY AND THE UNITED 
KINGDOM 5 (2011), available at http://www.detention-in- 
eu-
rope.org/images/stories/A2D/jrseuropefromdeprivationtoliberty20dec2011.pdf; 
see also HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, LEFT TO SURVIVE, supra note 18, at 28–29, 57; 
Updated Human Rights Watch Submission to the U.N. Comm. Against Tor-
ture, on Greece, supra note 33; Phillips, supra note 29. 
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absconding for which some nations have resorted to detention 
to prevent, while at the same time placing children in a more 
suitable, less restrictive environment.136 
A. The Conflict of Interest Must Be Eradicated 
1. The Problem and the Solution 
The conflict of interest problem posed by Greek guardianship 
of unaccompanied minors and the country’s immigration and 
asylum system is one of the obstacles precluding Greece from 
complying with its international law obligations under the CRC 
and the ECHR. 
In Greece, once an unaccompanied minor has been appre-
hended and identified as a minor, Greek law requires the mi-
nor be assigned a temporary guardian.137 “Public prosecutors” 
commonly fill these positions, and their performance of their 
responsibilities can be described as deficient at best.138 Many 
prosecutors are uninformed about what their responsibilities 
entail.139 They believe they do not have any real authority to 
represent minors in administrative immigration proceedings 
since the minors do not hold “regular” status and thus do not 
“legally exist.”140 In reality, it is only through representation by 
                                                                                                             
 136. AMARAL, supra note 135, at 6–9. 
 137. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, LEFT TO SURVIVE, supra note 18, at 25; see also 
Diatagma (220/2007) On the Transposition into the Greek Legislation of 
Council Directive 2003/9/EC from January 27, 2003 Laying down Minimum 
Standards for the Reception of Asylum Seekers (Greece), available at 
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/49676abb2.html. 
 138. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, LEFT TO SURVIVE, supra note 18, at 26; 
UNHCR, PROTECTING CHILDREN ON THE MOVE, supra note 48, at 19–20. Alt-
hough all unaccompanied minors are entitled to temporary guardians—the 
public prosecutors—this is rarely implemented. UNHCR, PROTECTING 
CHILDREN ON THE MOVE, supra, at 19–20. Prosecutors face many difficulties in 
appointing permanent guardians, including “the sheer volume of work that 
the prosecutors’ offices face, the limited human resources within the court’s 
existing services who can follow up the cases and the limited number of 
[p]ublic [p]rosecutors exclusively competent for minors.” Id. No “standardized 
practice followed by prosecutors” exists for the implementation of adequate 
guardians for unaccompanied minors. Id. See generally Simone Troller, In the 
Migration Trap: Unaccompanied Migrant Children in Europe, HUMAN RIGHTS 
WATCH, http://www.hrw.org/world-report-2010/migration-trap (last visited 
Dec. 1, 2013). 
 139. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, LEFT TO SURVIVE, supra note 18, at 26. 
 140. Id. at 27. 
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these prosecutors that unaccompanied minors may commence 
their applications for asylum.141 Furthermore, at times, prose-
cutors have ordered minors detained when other options for 
their care were not available.142 In other circumstances, where 
police have initiated a child’s detention, the police fail to inform 
prosecutors that such minors have been detained and, accord-
ingly, prosecutors are not given the opportunity to protect the 
children’s interests.143 
Thus, since police officials are essentially “responsible for . . . 
all aspects of immigration and asylum—including the adjudica-
tion of asylum claims at first instance and the deportation of 
migrants,” and since they are responsible for detention and its 
accompanying conditions,144 police officials become the de facto 
guardians or caretakers of these unaccompanied minors whilst 
in detention. This dual role creates a serious conflict of interest 
because the children’s interests are ignored and do not receive 
the proper protection that both international and Greek law 
require.145 By eliminating this conflict of interest, the EU, and 
Greece in particular, can start down the right path for ensuring 
that the best interests of the child are always a primary con-
sideration when faced with an unaccompanied minor who has 
entered the EU irregularly. 
While a recent amendment to Greek law seeks to place the 
responsibility of reviewing asylum claims in an autonomous 
body,146 this amendment has yet to be fully implemented.147 
                                                                                                             
 141. Id.; Troller, supra note 138. 
 142. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, LEFT TO SURVIVE, supra note 18, at 27, 69–70. 
 143. Id. at 20. 
 144. Id.; see also Gruberg, supra note 5, at 541. See generally Amnesty 
Int’l, The Dublin II Trap: Transfers of Asylum-Seekers to Greece, AI Index 
EUR 25/001/2010 (Mar. 10, 2010), available at 
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4c7f69362.html [hereinafter Amnesty 
Int’l, The Dublin II Trap]. 
 145. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, LEFT TO SURVIVE, supra note 18, at 69–70. 
 146. Greece Failing Asylum Seekers, IRIN (Oct. 15, 2012), 
http://www.irinnews.org/report/96547/migration-greece-failing-asylum-
seekers; The Asylum Service, HELLENIC REPUBLIC MINISTRY OF CITIZEN 
PROTECTION, 
http://www.minocp.gov.gr/asylo.php?option=ozo_content&perform=view&id=
3779&Itemid=465&lang=&lang=EN (last visited Oct. 30, 2013). Established 
by Greek law 3907/2011, Greece’s new Asylum Service seeks to transfer re-
sponsibility of asylum claims to an autonomous civilian body, which will “re-
ceive, examine and decide on all applications for international protection 
lodged in Greece.” The Asylum Service, supra; see also Paul Mason, Greece 
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The adjudication of asylum claims in the first instance largely 
remains in the hands of Greek police officials.148 The law faces 
serious hurdles in the form of lack of funding149 and inade-
quately qualified staff.150 In addition, Amnesty International 
has expressed its concern that police will continue to maintain 
responsibility over asylum claims of migrants in the first in-
stance, even after the amendment goes into full effect and, in 
particular, authority over the huge backlog of asylum applica-
tions that exists in Greece.151 Thus, even if finally implemented 
                                                                                                             
Asylum: Journey Through a Broken System, BBC NEWS (Feb. 19, 2013), 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-21509198 (discussing how Greece’s new 
“Asylum Service” is intended to primarily address the “difficult access to the 
asylum system in Greece”) (internal quotations omitted). 
 147. See Eur. Council on Refugees & Exiles, Greece Continues to Systemati-
cally Detain Asylum Seekers and Remains Unable to Address the Needs of 




 148. Greece Failing Asylum Seekers, supra note 146; KOULOCHERIS, supra 
note 99, at 12, 16 (describing the new Asylum Service as “not fully operation-
al” and how, during this “transitional” phase, police officials “remain[] re-
sponsible for examining asylum applications at first instance”). In addition, 
one online source on asylum information and news states that, of the units 
that the Asylum Service has begun to establish, one unit consists of staff that 
“has been appointed by the Greek police.” Golden Dawn Member in the Greek 
Dublin Unit, ASYLUM INFO. DATABASE (Sept. 27, 2013), 
http://www.asylumineurope.org/news/27-09-2013/golden-dawn-member-
greek-dublin-unit. In particular, one staff member was found to be a Greek 
police official who is a strong supporter of the Golden Dawn, Greece’s “neo-
Nazi” political party responsible for some of the xenophobic crackdowns on 
illegal migration. Id.; see Smith, supra note 6. This begs the question whether 
Greece’s new Asylum Service will actually accomplish its objectives of creat-
ing a civilian body to process asylum claims. Police officers who continue to 
adjudicate first instance asylum claims “often act in a discriminatory manner 
against migrants.” KOULOCHERIS, supra, at 16. “Arbitrariness is very common 
and there have also been cases of [p]olice brutality against asylum seekers.” 
Id. 
 149. Greece Failing Asylum Seekers, supra note 146. 
 150. Question for Written Answer P-003496/12 to the Commission, Ineffi-
ciencies in the New Greek Asylum Service Due to a Lack of Staff, 2013 O.J. (C 
130 E) 240 (expressing concern over the lack of adequate staffing for the new 
Asylum Service and the “inability to recruit personnel”). 
 151. Amnesty Int’l, The Greek Authorities Must Urgently Accelerate the Asy-
lum System Reforms and End Detention of Asylum Seekers, AI Index EUR 
25/003/2013 (Mar. 21, 2013), available at 
http://www.refworld.org/pdfid/514c22362.pdf. 
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throughout all of Greece, the conflict of interest with regard to 
unaccompanied minors’ care would likely persist. 
The United States faced a similar conflict of interest with re-
gard to the detention of unaccompanied minors, which it has 
sought to remedy.152 Much like Greece, thousands of unaccom-
panied minors153 enter the United States each year154 attempt-
ing to escape human rights violations,155 abuse, armed conflict, 
natural disasters, and political turmoil. 156  In many circum-
stances, like unaccompanied minors in Greece, they too are 
sent by their parents or have left on their own in search of a 
better life.157 Prior to 2003, apprehended unaccompanied mi-
nors were placed in the custody of the Immigration and Natu-
ralization Service (“INS”). 158  This governmental department 
was essentially both the children’s “caretaker and their prose-
cutor,” thereby resulting in a significant “conflict of interest.”159 
In other words, the INS was not only responsible for the chil-
dren’s care, but also for initiating their deportation proceed-
ings.160 As a result, there was an “institutional bias” in favor of 
                                                                                                             
 152. Carolyn J. Seugling, Toward a Comprehensive Response to the Trans-
national Migration of Unaccompanied Minors in the United States, 37 VAND. 
J. TRANSNAT’L L. 861, 869 (2004). 
 153. An unaccompanied minor, as defined in the United States, is “any per-
son under the age of 18 who is separated from both parents and is not being 
cared for by an adult who, by law or custom, has a responsibility to do so, and 
who is an asylum seeker, recognized refugee or other externally displaced 
person.” Linda A. Piwowarczyk, Symposium on Children and Immigration: 
Our Responsibility to Unaccompanied and Separated Children in the United 
States: A Helping Hand, 15 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 263, 264 (2006) (citation omit-
ted). 
 154. Ann Farmer, Under Age and Alone, Immigrants See a Softer Side of 
Detention, N.Y. TIMES (Jul. 14, 2009), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/15/nyregion/15minors.html [hereinafter 
Farmer, Under Age and Alone]. As of 2009, “roughly 7,200 unaccompanied 
minors [were] apprehended in the United States each year.” Id. 
 155. Benfer, supra note 36, at 730. 
 156. Piwowarczyk, supra note 153, at 265–66. See generally OLGA BYRNE & 
ELISE MILLER, VERA INST. OF JUST., THE FLOW OF UNACCOMPANIED MINORS 
THROUGH THE IMMIGRATION SYSTEM (2012), available at 
http://www.vera.org/sites/default/files/resources/downloads/the-flow-of-
unaccompanied-children-through-the-immigration-system.pdf. 
 157. Piwowarczyk, supra note 153, at 266. 
 158. Seugling, supra note 152, at 869. 
 159. Id. 
 160. Id. 
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detaining unaccompanied minors.161 Unaccompanied minors in 
U.S. detention faced many of the same harsh conditions that 
those in Greece today face—including lengthy stays, physical 
and emotional abuse, ill treatment as if they were criminals 
(shackling and restraining them), and oftentimes detention in 
the same centers as dangerous juvenile offenders.162 The U.S. 
government argued that detention protected the children and 
kept them out of harm’s way,163 but, in reality, the practice of 
detaining them had the opposite effect.164 
However, in 2003, U.S. policy regarding unaccompanied mi-
nors underwent a crucial change, transferring responsibility for 
their care from the INS, which functioned within the Depart-
ment of Justice (“DOJ”), to the Office of Refugee Resettlement 
(“ORR”) under the Department of Health and Human Services 
(“DHHS”).165 This transition was important, since the ORR al-
ready had extensive refugee experience and could contribute 
significantly due to the benefit of an incomparable network of 
resources.166 The revision effectively eliminated the conflict of 
interest.167 According to reports, although deficiencies in the 
system still persist,168 the ORR has made significant progress 
                                                                                                             
 161. Id. at 872. 
 162. Benfer, supra note 36, at 744–45; Seugling, supra note 152, at 869–70. 
 163. Benfer, supra note 36, at 750. 
 164. Piwowarczyk, supra note 153, at 271. Not only have children had to 
face abuse and other deplorable detention conditions, but such an environ-
ment has proven to have a deleterious effect on unaccompanied minors’ men-
tal health, including significant psychological and behavioral effects. Id.; see 
also Benfer, supra note 36, at 747. 
 165. Piwowarczyk, supra note 153, at 266. 
 166. Rebeca M. Lopez, Codifying the Flores Agreement: Seeking to Protect 
Immigrant Children in U.S. Custody, 95 MARQ. L. REV. 1635, 1653 (2012). 
 167. Seugling, supra note 152, at 875. 
 168. For example, as of 2003, one-third of all unaccompanied minors were 
still detained in “jail-like facilit[ies]” in the United States, violating “both 
national and international detention standards.” Lara Yoder Nafziger, Pro-
tection or Persecution?: The Detention of Unaccompanied Immigrant Children 
in the United States, 28 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL’Y 357, 381–82 (2006). Offi-
cials have blamed this continued detention on exceptions to the new policies 
regarding child detention, which permit the detention of unaccompanied mi-
nors in secure facilities under certain limited circumstances such as “influx, 
emergency,” or where the minors have had a criminal or dangerous past. Id. 
at 382. Although, some statistics show that many of these unaccompanied 
minors are still detained for reasons beyond those provided for under the ex-
ception. Id.; see also Lopez, supra note 166, at 1651, 1666; Odette Yousef, 
Study: Undocumented Immigrant Youth Languish in Adult Jails, WBEZ 
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in ameliorating the treatment of unaccompanied minors in U.S. 
custody through this transition.169 By establishing the Unac-
companied Refugee Minors (“URM”) Program,170 operating on 
the principle that children should be placed in “the least re-
strictive setting appropriate to their age and special needs,”171 
the ORR has worked toward a more humane treatment of un-
accompanied minors by placing them in detention alternatives 
such as foster care, group homes, “residential treatment cen-
ters,” and “independent living programs.”172 
A similar approach may be taken to remedy the situation in 
Greece. The EU’s Reception Conditions Directive provides that 
member states “take measures to ensure that a representative 
represents and assists . . . unaccompanied minor[s] to enable 
[them] to benefit from the rights and comply with the obliga-
tions provided for” in the directive.173 These include schooling, 
the protection of “physical and mental health,” and generally 
“an adequate standard of living,” inter alia.174 However, Greece 
has failed to provide this type of representation to unaccompa-
nied minors and consequently provides inadequate care, resort-
ing instead to detention in the same facilities that confine adult 
migrants, despite the fact that this violates provisions of the 
                                                                                                             
(June 5, 2013), http://www.wbez.org/news/study-undocumented-immigrant-
youth-languish-adult-jails-107539 (discussing the detention by U.S. Immigra-
tion and Customs Enforcement of unaccompanied minors for longer than the 
federally prescribed seventy-two hours prior to the transfer of their custody 
to the DHHS). 
 169. Joyce Koo Dalrymple, Seeking Asylum Alone: Using the Best Interests 
of the Child Principle to Protect Unaccompanied Minors, 26 B.C. THIRD 
WORLD L.J. 131, 159 (2006); see also Nafziger, supra note 168, at 379; 
Piwowarczyk, supra note 153, at 274. 
 170. Children eligible for the URM Program include those that are under 
eighteen, unaccompanied, and that are: refugees, entrants, asylees, or victims 
of trafficking. Unaccompanied Refugee Minors, OFFICE OF REFUGEE 
RESETTLEMENT (Aug. 16, 2012), 
http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/orr/resource/unaccompanied-refugee-
minors. 
 171. Piwowarczyk, supra note 153, at 288 (internal quotation marks omit-
ted); see also BYRNE & MILLER, supra note 156, at 9, 14–17. 
 172. About Unaccompanied Refugee Minors, OFFICE OF REFUGEE 
RESETTLEMENT, http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/orr/programs/urm/about 
(last visited Oct. 8, 2012); see also BYRNE & MILLER, supra note 156, at 14–17. 
 173. Reception Conditions Directive, supra note 40, art. 24(1), at 107. 
 174. Id. art. 14, 17(2), at 104. 
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directive.175 As a result, a conflict of interest arises, much like 
the former circumstances in the United States, where Greek 
police officials are both responsible for aspects of immigration 
proceedings and for the unaccompanied minors’ care in deten-
tion, without any party truly protecting the minors’ interests.176 
The elimination of the conflict of interest will aid in the process 
of ensuring that Greece is in compliance with its international 
obligations under the CRC and the ECHR.177 
Like the United States, the EU should amend the Reception 
Conditions Directive and require that each member state cre-
ate a separate organization or agency with the requisite spe-
cialized skills and resources that can adequately provide for 
refugee assistance and, more specifically, for the care of unac-
companied minors. By developing a program that is separate 
from the government departments which handle asylum claims 
and other immigration matters, much like the U.S. URM Pro-
gram, the EU can ensure that unaccompanied minors’ best in-
terests are taken into consideration first and foremost rather 
than secondary to immigration policy objectives.178 Additional-
                                                                                                             
 175. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, LEFT TO SURVIVE, supra note 18; Human Rights 
Watch’s Updated Submission to the Committee on the Rights of the Child on 
Greece, supra note 2; see also Reception Conditions Directive, supra note 40, 
art. 11(2), at 103. 
 176. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, LEFT TO SURVIVE, supra note 18, at 2, 25–28, 
32–37, 53–54, 59–62; see also Amnesty Int’l, The Dublin II Trap, supra note 
144. For a description of the conflict of interest in the United States, see gen-
erally Seugling, supra note 152. 
 177. For examples of how the elimination of the conflict of interest has be-
gun to bring the United States more in line with international law, see 
Seugling, supra note 152, at 875; see also Dalrymple, supra note 169, at 159; 
Nafziger, supra note 168, at 379–81; Piwowarczyk, supra note 153, at 274. 
 178. The importance of the best interests of the child principle has been 
emphasized in new policies found in other EU member states. For example, 
[u]ntil recently unaccompanied minors in the Netherlands were 
placed in detention if they entered the territory without documenta-
tion. Three hundred minors were detained in 2009. The Dutch Min-
ister for Immigration and Asylum, G.B.M. Leers, announced on the 
10th of March 2011 that unaccompanied migrant children will no 
longer be placed in immigration detention. The interest of the child 
will be valued higher than a possible flight risk. Unaccompanied mi-
nors will instead receive temporary housing through the central asy-
lum authority. 
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ly, such an organization would be responsible for the care of all 
unaccompanied minors, not just those who apply for interna-
tional protection. The application of this new provision mandat-
ing the establishment of a specialized organization requires an 
amendment to the scope of the Reception Conditions Directive. 
Currently, the directive applies strictly to “third-country na-
tionals and stateless persons who make an application for in-
ternational protection on the territory” of the EU, “including at 
the border.” 179 This caveat to the directive’s scope would apply 
only to the reception and subsequent care of unaccompanied 
minors and would not otherwise extend the scope of the di-
rective to other migrants who do not apply for international 
protection. This extension in scope will ensure that all unac-
companied minors, not simply those that apply for asylum, are 
protected by the proposed amendment, since all minors are 
vulnerable to this “institutional bias.” Additionally, this revi-
sion is important since, in many cases, minors abstain from 
applying for international protection for a variety of reasons.180 
2. Enforcement Mechanism 
The EU can ensure compliance with this amendment by mak-
ing assistance from Frontex,181 its border control agency, and 
                                                                                                             
Children Pave the Way for Alternatives to Detention in Holland, INT’L 
DETENTION COALITION (June 20, 2011), http://idcoalition.org/children-pave-
the-way-for-alternatives-to-detention-in-holland/ (emphasis added). 
 179. Reception Conditions Directive, supra note 40, art. 3(1), at 100 (em-
phasis added). 
 180. An amendment to the Reception Conditions Directive’s scope is im-
portant as many minors in Greece abstain from submitting asylum applica-
tions under the false belief that seeking such international protection will 
expose them to continued ill treatment by officials or that, by complying with 
immigration authorities, their time in detention will be prolonged whilst 
awaiting the adjudication of their asylum claims. AMARAL, supra note 135, at 
38–39; HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, LEFT TO SURVIVE, supra note 18, at 41. In addi-
tion, many feel that their chances of actually obtaining refugee status are 
very slim. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, LEFT TO SURVIVE, supra, at 41. 
 181. Established by EU Council Regulation 2007/2004 on October 26, 2004, 
the European Agency for the Management of Operational Coordination at the 
External Borders of the Member States of the European Union (“Frontex”) 
“promotes, coordinates and develops European border management in line 
with the EU fundamental rights charter applying the concept of Integrated 
Border Management.” Mission and Tasks, FRONTEX, 
http://www.frontex.europa.eu/about-frontex/mission-and-tasks (last visited 
Oct. 23, 2013); Origin, FRONTEX, http://www.frontex.europa.eu/about-
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EU funding provided to member states for related issues such 
as border protection, immigration, and asylum policy,182 con-
tingent on creating these separate organizations. Because its 
borders have been especially porous,183 Greece has become par-
ticularly reliant on EU aid earmarked specifically for assis-
tance in border controls, such as assistance from Frontex.184 
Additional financial support, such as relief from the European 
Refugee Fund185 and the External Borders Fund,186 would also 
                                                                                                             
frontex/origin (last visited Oct. 23, 2013). Frontex is responsible for planning 
and implementing joint operations at member states’ external borders, 
“providing a rapid response capability . . . in case of a crisis situation at the 
external border,” “assisting [m]ember [s]tates in joint return operations,” and 
providing important information “regarding emerging risks and the current 
state of affairs at the external borders.” Mission and Tasks, supra. 
 182. Approximately 0.8% of the EU’s budget is allocated to the category of 
“[f]reedom, security and justice,” which funds projects in “justice and home 
affairs, border protection, [and] immigration and asylum policy.” Where Does 
the Money Go?, EUR. COMM’N, 
http://ec.europa.eu/budget/explained/budg_system/fin_fwk0713/fin_fwk0713_
en.cfm (last updated Mar. 29, 2012). 
 183. Stevis, New Crisis for Greece, supra note 6. 




CT_part1_v5.pdf; RABIT Operation 2010 Ends, Replaced by JO Poseidon 
2011, FRONTEX (Mar. 2, 2011), http://www.frontex.europa.eu/news/rabit-
operation-2010-ends-replaced-by-jo-poseidon-2011-iA6Kaq; Update to Joint 
Operation Poseidon 2011, FRONTEX (Mar. 26, 2011), 
http://www.frontex.europa.eu/news/update-to-joint-operation-poseidon-2011-
jzZfWV. 
 185. Describing the need for a refugee fund, the European Commission 
states: 
Some countries face larger strains on their reception capacities and 
asylum systems due to the disproportionally large influxes of asylum 
seekers into their territories. European solidarity with these EU 
countries is ensured through practical cooperation, harmonisation of 
legislation and the European Refugee Fund (ERF). . . . The ERF . . . 
supports EU countries’ efforts in receiving refugees and displaced 
persons and in guaranteeing access to consistent, fair and effective 
asylum procedures. 
Refugee Fund, EUR. COMM’N, http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-
affairs/financing/fundings/migration-asylum-borders/refugee-
fund/index_en.htm (last updated Jan. 4, 2013). 
 186. Describing the External Borders Fund, the European Commission’s 
website states: 
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become contingent on implementing this amendment to the di-
rective. While completely withholding all aid would be both im-
practicable and inappropriate, the EU could create a sliding 
scale linking the level of implementation to the receipt of fund-
ing. The greater the state complied with the new amendment, 
the greater the percentage of allotted funds it would receive.187 
As a result, the consequences of noncompliance would be tangi-
bly and financially felt by member states. Making assistance 
contingent on the implementation of this new provision to the 
Reception Conditions Directive is an effective means of compel-
ling Greece to implement the relevant amendments and start 
down the path of compliance with its international law obliga-
tions.188 
3. Implementation 
Further, the EU must aid in the establishment of these spe-
cialized organizations, whose sole responsibility will be the care 
of unaccompanied minors who cross member states’ borders. 
The EU would help to establish these agencies by setting forth 
detailed requirements and guidelines that the agencies must 
follow in their operations. Furthermore, the EU should under-
take to help with member states’ implementation by providing 
                                                                                                             
For some countries, notably those situated at the external frontiers 
of the Union [such as Greece], . . . investments [in the protection of 
external borders] can be very large due to significant migratory pres-
sure at their borders. The External Borders Fund (EBF) provides fi-
nancial support to assist EU States in responding to such situations. 
External Borders Fund, EUR. COMM’N, http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-
affairs/financing/fundings/migration-asylum-borders/external-borders-
fund/index_en.htm (last updated June 28, 2013). 
 187. For example, the scale could operate as follows: if the member state 
only complied with the amendment to the directive at a level of 25%, that 
nation would only receive 25% of their EU allotted funding. Of course, the EU 
would also have to develop an appropriate method of measuring the level of 
member states’ compliance. 
 188. Greece receives “substantial financial support” (approximately €119 
million between 2007 and 2011) from the EU’s External Borders Fund, 
which, inter alia, has helped Greece to “improv[e] border management” and 
has ensured proper compliance with various EU directives governing irregu-
lar migration, such as the Returns Directive. PARL. EUR. DOC. (COM 250), 
supra note 184. 
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“specific investment in training and infrastructure.”189 Without 
such assistance, it is not enough to simply amend legislation, 
“additional endeavours relating to how they are to be imple-
mented” are needed. 190  Such specialized knowledge is im-
portant for organization officials to assess what is truly in 
these unaccompanied minors’ best interests and what level of 
care or type of facility, other than a detention center, is best 
suited for each individual unaccompanied minor.191 
Thus, the first step in solving the problem of Greek detention 
of unaccompanied minors is an administrative reorganization 
through the amendment of the EU’s Reception Conditions Di-
rective that would eliminate any conflict of interest in unac-
companied minors’ care. 
B. The “Best Interests of the Child” Principle Must Be Effective-
ly Implemented 
After eliminating any conflict of interest in unaccompanied 
minors’ care, the EU must ensure the actions of the specialized 
agencies responsible for unaccompanied minors embody the 
“best interests of the child” principle. As the CRC emphasizes, 
because of their “physical and mental immaturity,” children 
are deserving of special safeguards and their vulnerability 
must be taken into account by states when issues concerning 
children arise.192 Such consideration can only be accomplished 
by putting the “best interests of the child” principle into prac-
tice in more than just a de jure fashion. This requires placing 
unaccompanied minors’ status as “children” first and foremost, 
                                                                                                             
 189. OPHELIA FIELD, OFFICE OF THE U.N. HIGH COMM’R FOR REFUGEES, 
ALTERNATIVES TO DETENTION OF ASYLUM SEEKERS AND REFUGEES 47, ¶ 162, 
U.N. Doc. POLAS/2006/03 (2006), available at 
http://www.refworld.org/pdfid/4472e8b84.pdf. 
 190. See id. 
 191. Among the factors that have been proven to lead to successful alterna-
tives to detention is the availability of “holistic support,” which operates on a 
case-by-case basis of case management, assessing the needs of each individu-
al including whether it is appropriate to provide “social support[] [and] legal 
assistance,” inter alia. AMARAL, supra note 135, at 8, 11, 19, 22, 27, 46, 49. 
For an explanation of how the United States’ ORR receives, makes assess-
ments on, and thereafter places unaccompanied minors, see BYRNE & MILLER, 
supra note 156, at 14–17. 
 192. Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 37, pmbl. 
2014] UNACCOMPANIED MINORS 783 
above their status as “migrants,”193 by completely prohibiting 
the detention of unaccompanied minors194 within the EU and 
by replacing such practices with alternatives that seek to gain 
minors’ trust. 
1. Proscribing Any and All Detention of Children 
Detention has been proven to worsen preexisting traumas in 
unaccompanied minors, both physically and mentally, that re-
sult from their reasons for migrating in the first place—inter 
alia, to escape from abuse, armed conflict, and persecution.195 
The consequences of detention only have the effect of generat-
ing greater costs for a state both in the short and long term.196 
Thus, the first step in accomplishing the implementation of the 
“best interests” principle is to amend the Reception Conditions 
Directive so as to prohibit the detention of children under all 
circumstances. 
The CRC recognizes that children need special care and as-
sistance and prohibits the unlawful and arbitrary detention of 
children, permitting it only as a last resort and for the shortest 
appropriate duration.197 However, Greece continues to arbitrar-
ily detain migrants, 198  treating unaccompanied minors as 
                                                                                                             
 193. Eur. Parl. Ass., Motion for a Resolution Immigration Detention of Chil-
dren, Doc. No. 13050 (2012), available at 
http://www.assembly.coe.int/nw/xml/XRef/X2H-Xref-
ViewPDF.asp?FileID=19168&lang=en (“Children should be treated as chil-
dren first and foremost and their status as migrants should be a secondary 
and not a primary concern. . . . The Council of Europe should work towards 
ending the practice of detaining these children.”). 
 194. See, e.g., Asylum-Seekers and Migrants in Greece Hounded by Police 
Operations and Right-Wing Extremists, AMNESTY INT’L (Dec. 20, 2012), 
http://www.amnesty.org/en/news/asylum-seekers-and-migrants-greece-
hounded-police-operations-and-right-wing-extremists-2012-12-; HUMAN 
RIGHTS WATCH, LEFT TO SURVIVE, supra note 18; Motion for a Resolution on 
Immigration Detention of Children, supra note 193. Currently, the Reception 
Conditions Directive provides for the detention of unaccompanied minors as a 
last resort, “after it having been established that other less coercive alterna-
tive measures cannot be applied effectively.” Reception Conditions Directive, 
supra note 40, art. 11(2), at 103. 
 195. FIELD, supra note 189, at 50, ¶ 172. 
 196. Id. 
 197. Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 37, pmbl., art. 37(b). 
 198. Annual Report 2013: Greece, supra note 18; Court: Greece’s Treatment 
of Asylum Seeker Breached Human Rights Law, supra note 111; Dabilis, su-
pra note 111; ECJ Rules against Greece over Detention Standards, supra note 
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adults and confining them for seemingly indefinite durations 
that are longer than appropriate.199 When detention conditions 
have been shown to aggravate preexisting injuries and have led 
to depression, suicide, and have even resulted in hunger strikes 
in protest of such treatment,200 detention cannot be said to fur-
ther the “best interests” of the child. The only means by which 
the EU can effectively ensure that such a mechanism is not 
employed arbitrarily is to amend its laws so that detention of a 
child is always prohibited. 
2. Looking to Alternatives That Foster Trust 
By prohibiting detention, alternatives must be established in 
order to provide for the care of unaccompanied minors who 
would otherwise be detained and instead may end up living on 
the streets of Greece’s metropolises201 upon the prohibition of 
detention. Although imperfect, alternatives to the detention of 
                                                                                                             
111; Greece: Halt Mass Migrant Round-Ups, supra note 21; KOULOCHERIS, 
supra note 99, at 49–51. 
 199. See Annual Report 2013: Greece, supra note 18 (“Asylum seekers and 
irregular migrants, including unaccompanied children, were routinely de-
tained and for long periods.”); Greece: Lives on Hold, DOCTORS WITHOUT 
BORDERS (June 15, 2010), 
http://www.doctorswithoutborders.org/publications/article.cfm?id=4515&cat=
special-report (“Living conditions in detention facilities for migrants do not 
meet national and international standards. . . . No provisions are in place to 
meet the needs of vulnerable groups, including unaccompanied minors.”); 
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, LEFT TO SURVIVE, supra note 18, at 2. 
 200. See Costas Douzinas, These Hunger Strikers Are the Martyrs of Greece, 
GUARDIAN (Feb. 28, 2011, 12:25 PM), 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2011/feb/28/hunger-strikers-
greece-asylum-seekers; Greece: Lives on Hold, supra note 199. 
 201. See Human Rights Watch, Greece: Government Failing Migrant Chil-
dren, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (Dec. 22, 2008), 
http://www.hrw.org/news/2008/12/21/greece-government-failing-migrant-
children; HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, LEFT TO SURVIVE, supra note 18, at 13 (“A 
UNICEF sponsored study in 2000 estimated that there were about 5,800 
street children in the country.”); Maria Korologou, No Account of Immigrant 
Kids in Greece, GREEK REP. (Mar. 23, 2013), 
http://greece.greekreporter.com/2013/03/23/no-account-of-immigrant-kids-in-
greece/; Teenage Migrants “Trapped” in Greece, IRIN (Oct. 17, 2012), 
http://www.irinnews.org/printreport.aspx?reportid=96568; U.S. DEP’T OF 
STATE, supra note 130, at 13 (“[U]naccompanied or separated asylum-seeking 
minors often [are] not properly registered and [are] systematically detained 
in squalid conditions, often with adults. Many end[] up homeless in the 
streets, where they face[] heightened risks of exploitation and violence.”). 
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migrants have proven effective in other nations throughout the 
world.202 With the EU’s assistance, Greece can follow their ex-
ample in order to comply with the CRC and the ECHR. 
States often resort to detention for fear that migrants will 
abscond or that they will fail to comply with immigration pro-
cedures, thereby leading states to use detention as a deter-
rent.203 However, alternatives and trial substitutes utilized in 
other nations have proven just as successful in preventing 
these circumstances and even less costly than detention.204 In 
particular, alternatives that foster a sense of trust have proven 
the most effective.205 For example, these alternatives include 
those that seek to provide legal advice and inform migrants of 
their rights and of the consequences of failing to appear for 
immigration procedures, those that provide for unaccompanied 
minors’ daily needs, and those that provide them with “holistic 
support”206 through individual case management.207 
In some countries, migrants are offered assistance in ex-
change for their residence in designated accommodation cen-
ters, an approach that has been relatively successful in reduc-
ing the risk of absconding.208 For example, although detention 
is not prohibited in Germany, detention is infrequently or-
dered, and the law permits the placement of unaccompanied 
minors in various accommodation centers where their move-
                                                                                                             
 202. See Children Pave the Way for Alternatives to Detention in Holland, 
supra note 178; see also AMARAL, supra note 135; FIELD, supra note 189 (not-
ing that although alternatives have become more commonplace, there is still 
some degree of migrant detention in countries throughout the EU). Note that 
where alternatives exist and have proven effective, there are often still a lim-
ited number of cases of detention. See generally Eur. Council on Refugees & 
Exiles, Comparative Study on Practices in the Field of Return of Minors, Doc. 
No. HOME/2009/RFXX/PR1002 (Dec. 2011), available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/home-
affairs/doc_centre/immigration/docs/studies/Return_of_children-final.pdf 
[hereinafter ECRE, Comparative Study]. 
 203. FIELD, supra note 189, at 24, ¶ 87; see also Amnesty Int’l, Asylum-
Seekers and Migrants in Greece Hounded by Police Operations and Right-
Wing Extremists, supra note 194. 
 204. FIELD, supra note 189, at 48–49, ¶¶ 166–69. See generally AMARAL, 
supra note 135. 
 205. AMARAL, supra note 135, at 38–40, 44, 47. 
 206. Id. at 9. Holistic support entails extensive aid—legally, socially, and 
medically, inter alia. 
 207. Id. at 6–9, 42, 49; FIELD, supra note 189, at 45, ¶ 155. 
 208. See generally AMARAL, supra note 135; FIELD, supra note 189. 
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ment is restricted to within that accommodation center’s feder-
al district.209 Such accommodation is accompanied by compre-
hensive support and, as a result, reported compliance with im-
migration procedures is quite high.210 Likewise, both Austria211 
and Denmark212 have provided for state assistance contingent 
on residence in one of its accommodation centers, which has 
                                                                                                             
 209. FIELD, supra note 189, at 30, ¶¶ 109, 111; see also AMARAL, supra note 
135, at 25–29. 
 210. FIELD, supra note 189, at 30, ¶ 109. This report from the Office of the 
U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees hypothesizes that the high rate of 
compliance is a consequence of Germany’s conditions of reception and legal 
assistance provided to migrants. Id. 
 211. Austria has seen a decrease in the number of unaccompanied minors 
crossing its borders; nonetheless they are accommodated in specialized facili-
ties geared toward “persons to whom more ‘lenient measures’ apply.” ECRE, 
Comparative Study, supra note 202, at 221; see also NAT’L CONTACT POINT 
AUSTRIA, POLICIES ON RECEPTION, RETURN, INTEGRATION ARRANGEMENTS FOR, 






feb10_en.pdf. Detention generally is not applied, but is not always a last re-
sort either. ECRE, Comparative Study, supra, at 222. Unless detained, chil-
dren will attend school and are provided with basic welfare services. Id. Chil-
dren are housed in special “clearing houses” where they receive access to a 
comprehensive support network. FIELD, supra note 189, at 68. However, due 
to the limited capacities of these centers, many children receive only basic 
material support in the form of shelter and food, and it is up to them to ac-
quire any other necessities. Id. 
 212. Unaccompanied minors in Denmark can potentially be detained pro-
vided they are within the ages of fourteen and eighteen; however, very few 
are detained in practice, and only if there is a risk of absconding with no oth-
er adequate alternatives. ECRE, Comparative Study, supra note 202, at 238. 
Unaccompanied minors who are detained are immediately provided with pub-
lic counsel and are only detained for a short period. Id. Those minors not de-
tained may either be placed in special centers or are required to report to 
police in the alternative. Id. Other alternatives provided for under Danish 
law include “confiscation of passports, payment of a bail . . . [or] residence at 
‘an address determined by the police.’” Id. Unaccompanied minors placed in 
housing are accommodated in one of two accommodation centers—one for 
older children seventeen to eighteen years old and one for younger children. 
FIELD, supra note 189, at 98. These centers “operate like a rural boarding 
school.” Id. Children are also “always provided with a Red Cross guardian ad 
litem.” Id. 
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largely been believed to reduce the flight risk.213 For example, 
in Austria, the state assistance offered to unaccompanied mi-
nors includes “access to a comprehensive psychosocial support 
network” and the “development of an integration plan.”214 De-
tention of unaccompanied minors is generally not practiced in 
Belgium where they are housed in reception facilities and pro-
vided with access to education, healthcare, and legal guardi-
ans.215 In the United States, alternatives such as “shelter care,” 
foster care, and group homes, as discussed above, have proven 
to be rather successful alternatives to the detention of unac-
companied minors.216 Such alternatives have proven well suit-
ed for children’s vulnerability, providing them with the stabil-
ity they need, and are also more sensitive to their developmen-
                                                                                                             
 213. See ECRE, Comparative Study, supra note 202, at 220–23, 236–39; 
FIELD, supra note 189, at 68, 98. For a discussion on the suggested relation-
ship between immigration law compliance and trust in the system, see, e.g., 
AMARAL, supra note 135, at 38–39. (suggesting that a certain level of trust in 
the system increases compliance with asylum and immigration laws thereby 
decreasing the numbers of migrants who abscond, and further hypothesizing 
that noncompliance is due to an inherent fear of detention as often migrants 
believe that “adhering to immigrant authority obligations . . . will [actually] 
bring more harm than good” in the form of being detained). 
 214. FIELD, supra note 189, at 68; NAT’L CONTACT POINT AUSTRIA, supra note 
211, at 2–3. In Austria, unaccompanied minors living in “clearing houses” 
receive “access to a comprehensive psychosocial support network.” FIELD, 
supra, at 68. Furthermore, support offered to unaccompanied minors under 
Austria’s “Basic Welfare Agreement” includes healthcare, education, “lan-
guage courses,” and the “development of an integration plan.” NAT’L CONTACT 
POINT AUSTRIA, supra note 211, at 2–3. 
 215. See ECRE, Comparative Study, supra note 202, at 224–26. Belgium 
routinely refrains from detaining unaccompanied minors, unless there is 
doubt as to the migrant’s age. Id. at 225. If a child is detained because of 
doubt as to his or her age, the law provides that the child may not remain in 
detention for more than six days (in reality, this can be extended to nine days 
“if there are weekends and/or holidays within that period”). Id. Every child 
must be assigned a guardian who will provide him or her with assistance. Id. 
at 224. Belgium provides for accommodation centers, as stated in the text. 
However, due to shortages in the number of available spots, many children 
stay at initial reception centers much longer than the purported limited four-
week period or “disappear.” Eric Broekaert & Ilse Derluyn, Unaccompanied 
Refugee Children and Adolescents: The Glaring Contrast Between a Legal and 
a Psychological Perspective, 31 INT’L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 319, 325–26 (2008). 
 216. BYRNE & MILLER, supra note 156, at 14–17; Piwowarczyk, supra note 
153, at 265–67; see also About Unaccompanied Refugee Minors, supra note 
172; Farmer, Under Age and Alone, supra note 154. 
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tal, emotional, and psychological needs as minors.217 By provid-
ing vulnerable unaccompanied minors with the resources they 
need, these centers foster a sense of trust which ultimately re-
sults in a higher level of compliance with immigration proce-
dures, while also adhering to international law. 
The Reception Conditions Directive provides that once admit-
ted into the EU, and until ordered to return to their countries, 
unaccompanied minors seeking international protection should 
be accommodated in facilities other than detention centers, 
with the latter applied as a last resort.218 However, Greece has 
not applied this in practice.219 Although Greece currently offers 
a few hundred spots in “reception centers” to unaccompanied 
minors,220 there is a severe shortage of these centers and a rou-
tine preference for detention.221 Furthermore, much like the 
detention centers in which children are often placed instead, 
these reception centers lack minimum standards, are not de-
signed to provide for long-term care, and are often too large 
scale to provide individualized support to unaccompanied mi-
nors.222 Studies have shown that children who are referred to 
these care centers often abscond.223 The failure of such centers 
can be attributed to the lack of adequate resources and proper 
support provided to unaccompanied minors, which is essential 
to a child’s integration into society and, ultimately, his or her 
willingness to remain in such a center. Looking to the examples 
set by both the United States and other EU member states, 
Greece can strive to remedy existing centers and create new 
ones similar to the ones described above that will provide chil-
dren with their daily needs, medical care, and legal assistance. 
                                                                                                             
 217. Farmer, Under Age and Alone, supra note 154 (describing group home 
facilities for unaccompanied minors in the United States that provide them 
with social services, leisure activities, a limited education, and information 
about their rights). See generally Piwowarczyk, supra note 153. 
 218. Reception Conditions Directive, supra note 40, art. 11(2), 24(2), at 103, 
107–08. 
 219. See, e.g., Farmer, Impact of Immigration Detention, supra note 130; 
Greece Cracks Down on Illegal Immigration amid Financial Crisis, supra 
note 7; Greece: Halt Mass Migrant Round-Ups, supra note 21; Smith, supra 
note 6. 
 220. Troller, supra note 138. 
 221. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, LEFT TO SURVIVE, supra note 18, at 53, 65. 
 222. Id. at 65–66. 
 223. Id. at 68. 
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3. Enforcement Mechanism and Implementation 
Creation of these alternatives that foster trust in unaccom-
panied minors will be largely supported by the newly estab-
lished organizations pursuant to the amended Reception Con-
ditions Directive, as proposed above. With the help of these 
specialized agencies, as well as with the aid of various NGOs, 
institutions, and the appropriate local officials (such as the 
Greek Ombudsman),224 Greece can effectively rectify conditions 
in its various care centers. In addition, it will construct new 
accommodation centers, where staff will be provided with ap-
propriate training and guidelines by the EU’s mandated inde-
pendent unaccompanied minor organizations, in order to fur-
nish minors with the legal assistance and material aid that 
they need. As a result, unaccompanied minors will be deterred 
from absconding, while Greece will simultaneously come into 
compliance with its international law obligations. 
Compliance with these added requirements can place a bur-
densome economic strain on EU member states, especially on 
states like Greece that are located along the EU’s external bor-
ders.225 Similar to the enforcement measures mentioned above, 
the EU can ensure that a certain percentage of the funding it 
provides in the form of the European Refugee Fund and the 
External Borders Fund are allotted toward the establishment 
of these detention alternatives that will adequately provide 
unaccompanied minors with the assistance they require. 226 
Again, the EU could ensure such funds are being used appro-
priately by implementing a sliding scale linking the level of 
implementation to the receipt of funding.227 In affecting these 
changes, and placing children in settings that are suitable to 
                                                                                                             
 224. The Greek Ombudsman can play an important part in acting as a 
“watch-dog” for protecting the rights of unaccompanied minors in Greece. 
This official is “entrusted to protect the rights of citizens and non-citizens, 
with a separate department on children’s rights.” Id. at 17. In 2005, the Om-
budsman issued a special report urging the government to stop detaining 
unaccompanied minors, a practice which was deemed inappropriate by the 
Ombudsman. Id. at 5, 15. 
 225. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, STUCK IN A REVOLVING DOOR, supra note 27, 
at 19; HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, TURNED AWAY, supra note 48, at 11; Paphitis, 
supra note 7; Stevis, New Crisis for Greece, supra note 6. 
 226. See External Borders Fund, supra note 186; Refugee Fund, supra note 
185. 
 227. See supra note 187. 
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their juvenility and vulnerability, the “best interests of the 
child” principle will be effectively implemented as children’s 
individual needs will be assessed and addressed by the newly 
established aforementioned organizations. 
In following these steps, the EU can help Greece come into 
compliance with both the CRC and the ECHR, ending the de-
tention of unaccompanied minors and providing them with ap-
propriate assistance that will respect their needs and promote 
their dignity. 
CONCLUSION 
As the CRC notes, by reason of their vulnerability and imma-
turity, children are in need of special legal safeguards.228 The 
detention of migrants in substandard conditions in Greece has 
been found to violate the ECHR.229 It is not uncommon for un-
accompanied minors to face the same conditions that have been 
found illegal by the European Court of Human Rights.230 There 
are also implications of violations of the CRC in Greece’s prac-
tices. As a result, the EU must aid Greece in coming into com-
pliance by amending the Reception Conditions Directive. By 
executing the proposed amendments, Greece will be compelled 
into compliance or will otherwise face irreparable harm in the 
form of loss of EU financial aid, which it so desperately needs 
during these trying times of economic hardship and mass mi-
gration.231 Nonetheless, the EU can amend its regulations, but 
                                                                                                             
 228. Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 37, pmbl.; see also 
Introduction: Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 67. 
 229. M.S.S. v. Belgium & Greece, App. No. 30696/09, ¶¶ 233–34 (Eur. Ct. 
H.R. Jan. 21, 2011), available at 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-103050. 
 230. See generally Amnesty Int’l, Routinely Detained in Substandard Con-
ditions, supra note 99, at 29–41; Updated Human Rights Watch Submission 
to the U.N. Comm. Against Torture, on Greece, supra note 33. 
 231. Regarding Greece’s economic crisis and its relation to the migrant 
problem, see generally Greece Cracks Down on Illegal Immigration amid Fi-
nancial Crisis, supra note 7 (considering Greece’s struggles with “recession, 
illegal immigration and . . . rise in violent crime,” as well as the EU’s efforts 
to aid in border protection efforts); Hadjimatheou, supra note 17 (discussing 
Greece’s economic crisis and the increased migrant racism that has resulted); 
Paphitis, supra note 7 (highlighting the influx of migrants into Greece which 
has exacerbated “Greece’s severe economic problems and high unemploy-
ment”); Smith, supra note 6 (discussing Greece’s status as a “magnet for mi-
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it is up to Greece to implement these new rules. Through the 
assistance of specialized agencies, guided by the EU, and 
through access to a new vast array of resources specifically de-
signed to protect the interests of unaccompanied minors, 
Greece will find compliance both easier and more beneficial to 
its own long-term interests, whilst bringing itself in line with 
both the CRC and the ECHR. 
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